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A sample of cash-only acquisitions of Nasdaq targets during 1973-1999 is examined. It is found that the mean (median) percentage premia declines from 74% (65%) during the 1970s to 47% (42%) in the 1990s. Consistent with recent research on the value reduction associated with diversification, it is observed that acquirers generally will not pay higher prices to acquire firms operating in different industries. It is found that over-invested firms pursue acquisitions more aggressively by paying higher premia while under-invested firms pay less, on average. Finally, the evidence suggests that agency rather than synergistic or hubris effects influence the level of merger premia.

Three theories have been widely proposed to explain the significant negative market response to the announcement of a new equity issue. By observing a similar negative effect in a sample of zero and near zero long‐term debt firms, we are able to conclude that the capital structure hypothesis is not the sole explanation. Regressions of announcement period abnormal returns against subsequent cashflow change while controlling for price pressure effects provide evidence in support of the information hypothesis. Decomposition of the sample by issue purpose reveals a differential impact at the time of announcement consistent with an information‐based explanation.

The collapse of Bretton Woods or the fixed exchange rate system in 1973, along with the coinciding growth in global trade, and greater mobility of capital have all contributed to an increase in exchange rate volatility. Concerns about exchange rate levels and volatility have prompted central banks to actively intervene in foreign currency markets from time to time. This paper presents an empirical investigation of the relationship between central bank intervention actions and currency volatility. This paper is distinguished from earlier studies by employing expectation-based information contained in the currency futures prices to estimate conditional volatility in the USUS$/DM and US$/� returns, and by incorporating the simultaneity of the relationship between the Fed's intervention operation and exchange rate volatility into the model. Results suggest a lack of relationship between Fed's intervention activity and the US$/DM conditional volatility during the 1985-1993 period. However, Fed intervention is associated with negative changes in the US$/� volatility during the 1985 to 1993 period as a whole, and specifically during the 1 January, 1985 to 21 February, 1987 Plaza period and the 21 February, 1987 to 31 December, 1989 Louvre period. Furthermore, the results document a strong feedback effect (bidirectional causality) between US$/� volatility and intervention actions. During the post-Louvre period (1 January, 1990 to 31 December, 1993), it is found that the Fed's intervention led to an increase in the volatility of US$�, without a corresponding feedback relationship. The sign reversal is attributed to the breakdown of the Louvre Accord and the mixed nature of monetary policy signals given during this period.