No abstract

This article focuses on the interactions among four parties during 1974-77 that led to their combining to form the Janata Party, which represented a united opposition to the then Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi and her Congress government in January 1977. These inter-party exchanges remain an overlooked episode in the works on the Janata Party, when compared to its much written about the failure in government (1977-79). Forty years on, Janata Party's formation continues to be understood as a natural and inevitable response to the imposition of emergency by Mrs Gandhi in June 1975. This article, instead, focuses on the engagements among the leaders of the Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD), Congress (O), Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) and the Socialist Party (SP) before, during and after the emergency and contends that Janata's creation was neither a foregone conclusion nor a straightforward process. Second, this coming together of disparate individuals owed more to the possibility of gaining power and personal inclinations than any political principles or policy impulses. Third, while Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) is rightly celebrated as the rival protagonist in oppositional politics to Mrs Gandhi, this article argues that there were limits to his leadership in forging the new party and there was no automatic evolution of the latter from the former. This article is based on the papers of JP and his secretary Brahmanand and, supplemented by other relevant material, shows an unheralded facet of an attempt, which might have come to power on hyperbole but its formation was hard work.

Ousted as Premier, Jammu and Kashmir, in August 1953 and anointed as Chief Minister in February 1975, the so-called ‘Lion of Kashmir’ Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was imprisoned, in between these years, ultimately on charges of treason, with brief intermissions. Much has been written about the politics of Kashmir dispute, less so about the Sheikh and his personal troubles especially after the death of his friend Jawaharlal Nehru in May 1964. This somewhat overshadowed decade of his life, in comparison with his hey-days of 1947–1953, shows the kind of settlement in Kashmir that the government of Indira Gandhi was willing to consider. More interestingly, it shows how Sheikh Abdullah was willing to agree to it and provides the context in which he moved from being in a conflictual relationship with New Delhi to becoming, once again, a collaborator in Srinagar in 1975, thereby showcasing the limits of Abdullah’s politics and popularity.

By revisiting the events from July 1947 to February 1948 that comprised the accession of the princely state of Junagadh to India, this article gives an insight into the newly independent Dominion’s ‘mobilisation of violence’ in re-fashioning its sovereignty and authority. In doing so, it adds to the growing historical literature on state formation in India that argues that multiple crises of the period 1947–49—post-partition violence in Punjab and Delhi, rebellion, accession and war in Kashmir and the so-called ‘police-action’ in Hyderabad—far from being aberrations to the emerging Indian nation-state were, instead, affairs through which its new sovereignty evolved. The mobilisation of Indian defence forces in the lead up to the accession of Junagadh in November 1947 and the management of violence directed at Junagadh’s Muslims afterwards are yet another instance of the forcible incorporation of Indian princely states and Indian Muslims into the reconstructed post-colonial state. Present in this matrix were also the ‘sub-states’ within Junagadh and the attendant questions of their autonomy, an instrumentalist alarmism about popular will and unrest and a hastily conducted referendum. These aspects of this contested accession have remained overshadowed in the historical record and are here revised to provide an alternative narrative.

No abstract