PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to offer an appreciation of the role of national oil companies (NOCs) which control roughly 90 percent of the global hydrocarbon reserves, and whose operating and investment decisions affect prices, demand adjustments as well as their countries' policy options. Given that the role of NOCs is poorly understood largely due to prevailing economic and political clichés that substitute for analysis, this paper takes an institutional economics perspective to analyse the issue of NOC governance and related issues.Design/methodology/approachThe paper adopts an integrative approach. First, it introduces the language of institutional economics to broadly structure a review of NOC governance. It then links the theoretical discussion to an assessment of the macro‐economic imperatives to which the NOC and its governance may need to respond. Finally, an audit trail is used for assessing cases in their particular institutional, cultural and physical conditions. Any simple comparisons — across highly variable contexts – would not only be contentious but also run counter to institutionalist methodology.FindingsThe paper shows that NOCs need not be treated as black boxes. They constitute an institutional response to failing market coordination with international oil companies and a means for producer countries to align political and economic interests. Yet, overriding the market and creating powerful stand‐alone, state‐owned, state‐run enterprises raise efficiency and broader regulatory concerns. The paper shows how institutional economics offers a conceptual apparatus to identify options for regulating NOCs at interrelated levels of control and suggests the need for case‐by‐case assessment.Research limitations/implicationsApplying the conceptual apparatus outlined in the paper may allow future research to systematically discuss particular features of NOC governance, generate more general pattern models, and thereby improve the base for decisions on NOC's strategies and regulation.Originality/valueThe originality of the paper lies in its integrated approach of analysis and employing the institutional economics approach to the case studies to reveal the role of NOCs in the energy scene.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. When it comes to energy policy, EU countries go their own way with little regard for other member states. What strategies exist in the EU Commission to coordinate and integrate energy markets? Are these strategies consistent with national plans currently in action? Is it too late to establish a unifi ed energy policy? What can be achieved in a unifi ed energy policy given the considerable differences in resource endowment and political preferences in energy strategies? Can the effectiveness of EU energy policy objectives be enhanced through policy coordination at the regional scale? This Forum seeks to provide answers to these questions. DOI: 10.1007/s10272-014-0507-x Sebastian Strunz, Erik Gawel and Paul Lehmann Terms of use: Documents in On the Alleged Need to Strictly Europeanise the German EnergiewendeGermany has embarked on an ambitious project to transform its energy system by 2050 -the so-called Energiewende. Some critics contend that the Energiewende imposes unnecessary and avoidable welfare losses due to a lack of integration within the EU. However, these critiques largely miss the point because the asserted lack of integration cannot be pinned on the Energiewende, and the welfare consequences of EU-wide integration are less clear than the critiques imply.Germany aims to completely redesign its energy system within the next few decades. In particular, nuclear power shall be phased out by 2022 and the share of renewable energy sources (RES) in overall electricity supply shall be increased to at least 80 per cent by 2050. While many international observers regard this ambitious set of energy transition targets with a mix of applauding respect and slight scepticism, 1 some domestic critics judge the transformation project very harshly. Specifi cally, they criticise the Energiewende for being a national and unilateral approach that fails to reap the potential benefi ts of an EU-wide approach.2 It has even been suggested that Germany, by rolling out Energiewende policies, acts as a kind of wrongway driver heading in the opposite direction to a presumed 1 See, for example, D. B u c h a n : The Energiewende: Germany's Gamble, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, SP 26, 2012. 2 For example, acatech: Die Energiewende fi nanzierbar gestalten: Effi ziente Ordnungspolitik für das Energiesystem der Zukunft, acatech Position, Heidelberg 2012; J. We i m a n n : Atomausstieg und Energiewende: Wie sinnvoll ist der deutsche Alleingang?, in: Energiewirtschaf...

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Article -Published VersionThe EU water framework directive: Meeting the global call for regulatory guidance?

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.