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This report summarizes the findings and recommendations of an international workshop that was organized jointly by IUPAC and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and held in Zagreb, Croatia, from 22 to 25 April 2007. It was held to assist with preparation for the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which will commence in April 2008. The CWC has been in force since 29 April 1997, and today 182 States have joined the Convention. The CWC aims at the total prohibition of all chemical weapons (CW) and the destruction of all CW stockpiles and production facilities by 2007. Extensions have been agreed upon and, for some CW stockpiles, the deadline is now 2012. This disarmament is subject to strict international verification by the OPCW. The CWC also prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, and retention of CW and requires national implementation measures, including legislation, together with the international verification of chemical industry facilities. Furthermore, the CWC aims to strengthen States Parties' capacities in the field of protection against CW, and encourages international cooperation in the peaceful application of chemistry. The CWC requires that reviews of the operation of the Convention are carried out at five-year intervals and specifies that such reviews "shall take into account any relevant scientific and technological developments", so as to ensure the continued effectiveness of the treaty and of its verification and implementation systems. This report has been prepared to assist the parties of the CWC with that review.

The article gives an overview on worldwide efforts to eliminate chemical weapons and facilities for their production in the context of the implementation of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It highlights the objectives of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international agency set up in The Hague to implement the CWC, and provides an overview of the present status of implementation of the CWC requirements with respect to chemical weapons (CW) destruction under strict international verification. It addresses new requirements that result from an increased threat that terrorists might attempt to acquire or manufacture CW or related materials. The article provides an overview of risks associated with CW and their elimination, from storage or recovery to destruction. It differentiates between CW in stockpile and old/abandoned CW, and gives an overview on the factors and key processes that risk assessment, management, and communication need to address. This discussion is set in the overall context of the CWC that requires the completion of the destruction of all declared CW stockpiles by 2012 at the latest.

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UNIDIR is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems. NOTE The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual authors. They do not necessary reflect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR, its staff members or sponsors.