The textbook view that cartels increase industry pro¢ts and lower consumer welfare ignores the e¡ects of competition in other activities. A revisionist view shows that when cartel members compete in other activities, i.e. when they semi-collude, the cartel members may be worse o¡ and consumers better o¡. Using a two-stage model in which the non-production activity is R&D and is subject to technological spillovers, we show that both the traditional and revisionist views can be wrong, that consumers and producers can both be made worse o¡, or both better o¡, by a semi-collusive production cartel.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to California Management Review.How can one tell which decisions are strategic? This article proposes a framework that helps distinguish strategic decisions from non-strategic ones. Whether a decision is strategic or non-strategic depends on how a decision ranks along two dimensions: its influence on the degree of commitment and its influence on the scope of the firm. Four distinct types of decisions emerge: strategic, neo-strategic, tactical, and operational. This categorization of decisions can help the firm prioritize decisions, allocate resources, and develop capabilities. (

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.Abstract. Is R&D cooperation preferred to non-cooperative R&D, and does the answer depend on how firms choose output? And if anti-trust protection is provided to R&D, is it desirable to extend anti-trust protection to cooperative production as well? In our model, cooperative R&D is always preferred by both firms and consumers, regardless of how output is chosen. We then show that though innovation effort and profits are higher when both output and R&D effort are chosen cooperatively, consumer surplus and overall social welfare are higher when cooperation is restricted to R&D. La coope,ration dans la R&D et 1'exploitation conjointe de la R&D. Est-ce que la cooperation dans la R&D est pref6ree a la R&D sans cooperation, et est-ce que la reponse a cette question depend de la maniere utilisee par les entreprnses pour choisir le niveau de production? Et si la protection de la loi antitrust est accordee a la R&D, est-il d6sirable d'etendre cette protection a la production cooperative aussi? Dans le modele des auteurs, la cooperation dans la R&D est toujours la pref6rence des entreprises et des consommateurs, quelle que soit la maniere de choisir le niveau de production. On montre que m6me si l'effort d'innovation et les profits sont plus eleves quand les niveaux de production et de R&D sont choisis en cooperation, le surplus au consommateur et le niveau de bien-etre social global sont plus eleves quand la cooperation est limitee a la R&D.

We assemble and analyze a novel data set that provides evidence on the quality of decision-making by on-field umpires and teams in the sport of cricket. The decision review system, introduced in November 2009, gives teams a limited right to challenge an on-field umpire’s decision. Of the 1,201 on-field umpire decisions that were challenged in test matches by nine playing teams between 2009 and 2014, 310 (25.81%) were reversed by a 3rd umpire. Controlling for several match and team characteristics, logistic regressions show that (1) leg before wicket (LBW) and caught decisions that are ruled “out” by the on-field umpire are more likely to be reversed than decisions that are ruled “not out”; (2) for both LBW and caught decisions, home and away teams are equally likely to win a 3rd umpire reversal.

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