Formal international law is stagnating in terms both of quantity and quality. It is increasingly superseded by 'informal international lawmaking' involving new actors, new processes, and new outputs, in fields ranging from finance and health to internet regulation and the environment. On many occasions, the traditional structures of formal lawmaking have become shackles. Drawing on a two-year research project involving over 40 scholars and 30 case studies, this article offers evidence in support of the stagnation hypothesis, evaluates the likely reasons for it in relation to a 'turn to informality', and weighs possible options in response. But informal structures can also become shackles and limit freedom. From practice, we deduce procedural meta-norms against which informal cooperation is increasingly checked ('thick stakeholder consensus'). Intriguingly, this benchmark may be normatively superior (rather than inferior) to the validation requirements of traditional international law ('thin state consent').

(Paperback) 1. International and municipal law-European Union countries. 2. European Union countries-Foreign relations-Law and legislation. 3. International cooperation-European Union countries. I. Wessel, Ramses A., author. II.

No abstract

The European Union increasingly uses 'soft' international arrangements rather than formal international agreements in establishing relations with non-EU states. This contribution aims to raise the question of to what extent a move from hard to soft law in relations between the EU and its partners can be seen as allowing the Union to 'step outside' the legal framework (if that indeed is what is happening) and disregard the rules and principles that define the way in which EU external relations are to take shape. Possible consequences include the risk that these instruments are not subject to appropriate safeguards, that parliamentary influence (by the European Parliament as well as by national parliaments) is bypassed and that transparency is affected. There are various reasons for the EU not to use formal procedures, but a turn to informality does come at a price.

The European Union's security and defence policy (ESDP) was invented 10 years ago and has been operational for more than five years. During this period the EU has launched over 20 ESDP missions allowing the organization to be engaged in international crisis management in various ways. The coming years will reveal whether the European Union is able to meet its ambitions to carry out a greater number of more complex ESDP missions in higher-risk theatres. While the EU has stepped up the plate to meet these challenges, the three case studies discussed in this article (EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUFOR Tchad/RCA) reveal that the path paved with good intentions might in this case indeed lead to hell. Whereas the new Treaty of Lisbon introduces quite a few institutional changes to the current treaty regime of foreign affairs and security policy, it is questionable whether these innovations will significantly improve the decision-making and leadership on issues of ESDP and, consequently, the effectiveness of the Union as an international crisis manager. [M]ore than 20 civilian and military operations, are or have been deployed on almost every continent, from Europe to Asia, from the Middle East to Africa. Thousands of European men and women are engaged in these operations, ranging from military to police, from border guards to monitors, from judges to prosecutors, a wide range of people doing good for the stability of the world. This is the European way of doing things: a comprehensive approach to crisis prevention and crisis management; a large and diversified tool box; a rapid response capability; playing our role as a global actor. Obviously, if the Lisbon Treaty were to be ratified, and I hope it will be, we would be even more effective.