PurposeIn this study, the authors revisit Alberta's public-private partnership (P3) program after 20 years of field level experience by retracing its historical emergence and institutional evolution given its political context. Specifically, the authors adopt a path dependence perspective to reconstruct and reexamine Alberta's P3 program emergence, reflect on the successes achieved, and articulate challenges that must be overcome to institutionalize P3s as part of Alberta's infrastructure delivery environment in the future.Design/methodology/approachAdopting a constructivist approach and a case-based methodology, the authors (re)analyze the activities of governmental agents, private industry, and other actors as part of a new infrastructure policy introduced in 2002 to transform the provincial institutional landscape to accommodate P3.FindingsThe authors find Alberta's P3 emergence was driven by the necessity of its infrastructure deficits, political expediency, and resource scarcity. Furthermore, with well-entrenched conservative political actors as gatekeepers, Alberta's P3 implementation demonstrated stability and incremental change simultaneously, consistent with core elements of path dependency. Following the introduction of P3 in Alberta, the province lacked formal institutional structures that would transition its P3 program from good to great and enable it to become firmly embedded in the public infrastructure delivery landscape. With the subsequent absence of P3-convinced (political) leadership and uncertainty about its P3 policy direction, Alberta was unable or unwilling to consolidate the progress made at the start of the program.Originality/valueMost recently, the emergence of new political leadership in Alberta has (re)catalyzed policy progress, pointing toward a more methodical program approach, and suggesting a rediscovered confidence in P3s in the province with the establishment of a P3 Office (P3O), including nascent formal rules for unsolicited bids. These recent changes in our view make for a much more anchored policy and could lead to program sustainability and eventual institutionalization. Given the unpredictability of the recent political change, a more robust analysis of the relationship between political party control, leadership, and P3 stability is required to anticipate future policy and organizational obstacles.

We compare the 2007–2009 post‐financial‐crisis performance of US banks with their performance before the financial crisis, based on bank size using financial ratios. We find bank performance declined in the post‐financial‐crisis period as compared to its pre‐financial‐crisis performance, evidenced by reduced return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA), higher debt ratios, lower net interest margin, increased net loan losses, more nonperforming loans, and, to a lesser extent, estimated losses on loans. In difference‐in‐differences tests between the largest and smallest groups, we find the biggest banks report significantly higher ROA and lower debt ratio, in addition to outperforming small banks in net interest margin and loan loss reserves. Smaller banks did better only in net loan losses. General economic conditions and interest rate changes are controlled for in our results. We conclude that small banks have a significant disadvantage in the industry in the post‐financial‐crisis era compared to both big banks and their own pre‐financial‐crisis historical performance.