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We explore whether pioneering advantages exist for early-mover acquirers in industry acquisition waves by examining both combined (target and acquirer) and acquirer stock returns. Combined abnormal returns are higher for acquisitions that occur at the beginning of acquisition waves. However, for acquirers' returns, only strategic pioneers-those acting in manners consistent with having superior information-capture significant advantages. Specifically, early-mover acquirers who realize superior stock returns are those that conduct acquisitions in related industries, during industry expansionary phases, and finance their acquisitions as financial theory suggests they should when they possess an informational advantage-with cash. Our findings extend the first-mover literature to corporate practices and link these practices to acquisition returns.First-mover advantages represent an important concept in the strategic management literature and in business practice. A first-mover advantage implies that, by acting early relative to peers, a pioneer may establish a competitive advantage that enables it to garner positive economic profits (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988: 41). In the context of the resource-based view of the firm, an early mover can develop a resource that is rare, valuable, difficult to imitate and nonsubstitutable (Barney, 1986;Conner, 1991;Makadok, 1998;Wernerfelt, 1984). Despite the relatively wide acceptance of first-mover advantages, few empirical studies examine whether being an early mover in certain organizational practices materially affects performance. In the retrospective on and update of their original paper on first-mover advantages, Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) encourage more empirical research to identify the linkages between the resource-based view of the firm, first-mover advantages, and firm performance.First-mover advantages may be significant in industry acquisition waves. Acquisitions provide firms with a means to obtain valuable resources more quickly than is possible via internal capital expenditures (Finkelstein, 1997;Pfeffer, 1972). In light of the serious concerns that have been raised regarding the success of acquisitions in both practitioner and academic outlets (Business determination of factors that influence acquisition success remains an important research question.This study investigates whether being an early mover in the acquisition process affects shareholder returns. Specifically, we compare the stock market reactions to early-mover acquisitions (i.e.,

Research Summary: This study reexamines the relation between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and financial performance by benchmarking firms against industry peers in a given year to identify best-in-class and worst-in-class firms. We also address distributional

This study investigates the relation between the method of payment in acquisitions, earnings management, and operating performance for a large sample of firms that conducted acquisitions between 1985 and 1997. Prior to their acquisitions, acquirers exhibit levels of operating performance that exceed that of their respective industry peers. We find no evidence that acquirers manage their earnings prior to acquisitions, despite the possible incentives of managers who plan stock-based acquisitions to temporarily inflate their stock's purchasing power. Subsequent to acquisitions, acquirers continue to exhibit superior performance relative to their industry and experience significantly higher levels of operating performance than control firms with similar pre-event operating performance. Although the extant literature documents significant relations between the form of acquisition payment, announcement returns, and the post-acquisition excess return of acquirers, we find no evidence that the method of payment conveys information about the acquirer's future operating performance.

We estimate that 13.6% of all option grants to top executives during the period 1996-2005 were backdated or otherwise manipulated. Our study primarily focuses on grants that were unscheduled and at-the-money, of which we estimate that 18.9% were manipulated. The fraction is 23.0% before the new two-day filing requirement took effect on August 29, 2002, and 10.0% afterward. For the minority of grants that are not filed within the required two-day window, the fraction of manipulated grants remains as high as 19.9%. We further find a higher frequency of manipulation among tech firms, small firms, and firms with high stock price volatility. In addition, firms that use smaller (non-big-five) auditing firms are more likely to file their grants late. Finally, at the firm level, we estimate that 29.2% of firms manipulated grants to top executives at some point between 1996 and 2005.executive compensation, stock option grants, backdating