This article proposes a relational approach to studying judicial politics in non-Western societies—a framework for the systematic analysis of informal relations between judges and other actors, within and outside the judiciary, based on common political interests, ideas, social identity, and even clientelistic obligations. We reflect on how these relations might help explain a variety of outcomes of interest, such as the organization of courts, judicial behavior, and judicial reform. We also highlight some of the methodological challenges of this approach in collecting and analyzing comparative data. In doing so, we seek to build an agenda for research on informal judicial politics beyond Western democracies.

This article offers a theoretical discussion about courts in “hybrid regimes” that evolve from formerly democratic countries. The evolution toward authoritarianism typically allows governments more latitude to reduce judicial independence and judicial power. Yet, several reasons, including legitimacy costs, a tradition of using courts for judicial adjudication and social control, and even the use of courts for quenching dissent may discourage rulers from shutting down the judicial contestation arena and encourage them instead to appeal to less overbearing measures. This usually leads to a decline of the judiciary's proclivity to challenge the government, especially in salient cases. To illustrate these dynamics, I discuss the rise and fall of judicial power in Venezuela under Chávez's rule, focusing on the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. Formerly the most powerful institution in the country's history, the Chamber briefly emerged as an influential actor at the beginning of the regime, but a comprehensive intervention of the judiciary in 2004 further politicized the court and effectively reduced its policy‐making role.

This special issue proposes a relational approach to the study of judicial politics outside of Western democracies. The articles illuminate how common political interests, ideas, social identity, family and professional ties and even patron-client obligations between judges and other actors shape a variety of phenomena of interest to the study of judicial institutions, in terms of how the judiciary is organised and administered, how judges are appointed and make decisions, and the prospects for judicial reform. Collectively, the articles explore the informal dimension of judicial politics in a systematic fashion, through rich empirical case studies in very different contexts. Thus, they help structure a new comparative agenda for research on informal judicial politics outside of the West.

RESUMENEl 2015 fue un año muy importante en la política venezolana. Por primera vez desde que el chavismo asumió el control de los poderes públicos en el país tras la llegada de Hugo Chávez al poder en 1998, la coalición opositora Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD) ha ganado las elecciones legislativas por un margen considerable sobre el oficialista Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) ¿En qué contexto ocurrió un giro tan dramático en el escenario político venezolano? ¿Por qué gana la Unidad? ¿Es posible la coexistencia democrática de estos dos grupos políticos en el marco de un régimen híbrido con prácticas autoritarias tan arraigadas? El presente artículo ofrece datos relevantes para responder estas interrogantes, las cuales son claves para entender la situación actual y futuro inmediato del país.

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