This paper makes sense of the contract-control-trust nexus in interfirm relationships by exposing the performativity of a contract and its incorporated control structures in generating trust. In our study of an outsourcing relationship between Semorg (an international manufacturer of semi-conductors) and Fasorg (the provider of facility management services), we find that trust is interactively related to control in complex and often unpredictable ways rather than in linear ways that result from managerial decision-making. In the network of associations that constitutes the interfirm relationship, trust is not a stable solution that generates predictability, but a quasi-actor that is made to act by the contract and the incorporated control structures. As a quasi-actor, trust is fluent and performative. Once in existence, it mobilises human actors and shapes the relationship. Thus, from a relational perspective trust is a possible and to a large extent unpredictable network effect. This differs from the rational perspective in which trust is an expectation that (in multiple categories) straightforwardly emerges and develops from managerial decisions.

Purpose-The paper aims to explore management control structure change related to the development of an SSC. Design/methodology/approach-The paper explores a transaction costs economics perspective (TCE-perspective) on management control structure change related to the development of an SSC. Particularly, it explores and challenges the scope of such a perspective both in terms of contents (i.e. the nature of management control related to the dimensions of transactions) and process (i.e. the way change is effectuated). It does so by theorizing as well as empirically investigating management control structure change through a case study at PCM (a Dutch newspaper publisher) Findings-Our theoretical analysis broadens existing frameworks of management control structures by particularly pointing to the possibility of including governance structures for internal transactions and exit threats (connected to a market mechanism) in the management control structure of an organization. However, our empirical investigations challenge the broader framework: the possibility of an exit threat was not explicitly considered by top management ('the designer' of management control). More profoundly, empirical investigations challenge the calculative approach of the change and show that the change in management control is to a large extent a drifting process. Research limitations/implications-An instrumental calculative approach towards SSCrelated management control change should be complemented with a relational perspective on such change, in order to further explore its drifting character. Practical implications-A transaction costs economics approach to change in management control might provide practitioners with insights into the efficiency of specific management control structures. Originality/value-The paper contributes to the extant knowledge by both exploring and challenging a TCE-perspective on SSC-related changes in management control.

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