Although several targeted welfare programs across the world have made owner-occupied housing exempt from the means test, relatively little is known about the impact of such exemption on portfolio choice and consumption. We study the Australian age pension scheme and argue that current uncapped exemption may lead to distortionary incentives for high levels of housing wealth to be sheltered from the means test. We set up a life-cycle model with explicit housing choice and borrowing constraints to match some key features of the Australian economy. We find that abolishing the exemption of owner-occupied housing in the assets test increases aggregate output, capital accumulation, and welfare, but decreases housing investment and homeownership. However, removing such distortions does not necessarily imply that all households would be better off. Lowering taxes to maintain fiscal balance would result in wealthy households experiencing a large welfare loss, whereas the majority of the population would benefit.

Delhi has had the distinction of being one of the most polluted cities in the world, especially in the winter months from October—January. These months coincide with the religious festival of Diwali. It is argued that air quality gets worse in the aftermath of Diwali on account of firecrackers that get burned during the festival. We use hourly data on PM 2.5 particulate concentration from 2013 to 2017 to estimate the Diwali effect on air quality in Delhi. We improve on existing work by using the event study technique as well as a difference-in-difference regression framework to estimate the Diwali effect on air quality. The results suggest that Diwali leads to a small, but statistically significant increase in air pollution. The effect is different across locations within Delhi. To our knowledge, this is the first causal estimate of the contribution of Diwali firecracker burning to air pollution.

Regulation of retail finance has been the subject of policy interventions in several countries, including India. Much of the regulatory change in India has been carried out with little support of empirical evidence. This paper is motivated by questions of the evidence of losses due to mis-sales of financial products. It constructs two measures of the loss to customers due to mis-selling of life insurance policies. The first is calculated using the value of lapsed policies, and the second uses the persistence of premium payments. Both arrive at estimates of around USD 28 billion lost between 2004 and 2011.

Mutual fund companies typically charge investors distribution fees, such as 12b-1 fees in the United States, which they then use to pay commissions to brokers. We evaluate a major Indian investor protection reform that limited the ability of mutual funds to charge distribution fees to pay broker commissions. We identify the impact of this policy change by comparing funds charging high distribution fees prior to the reform to those charging low distribution fees; we show that trends in asset growth across these groups prior to the reform were similar, and argue that a comparison of their asset growth after the reform is indicative of the policy impact. Contrary to claims by industry that banning distribution fees would dramatically reduce investment in mutual funds, we find no evidence that the post-reform asset growth was lower for funds charging higher distribution fees prior to the reform. We primarily find that asset growth in funds with previously high distribution fees was higher after the policy change. At the aggregate level, our results suggest that Indian mutual fund growth in the post-policy period was lower for reasons independent of this policy change, such as a general move away from mutual funds towards real assets such as gold and real estate following the 2008 financial crisis.

This paper examines who contributes and who persists in contributing in a national, voluntary, defined contributory pension program, where the government provides the incentive of matching contributions of a minimum amount (USD 16Abstract This paper examines who contributes and who persists in contributing in a national, voluntary, defined contributory pension program, where the government provides the incentive of matching contributions of a minimum amount (USD 16). The paper uses proprietary data from a financial services firm where 12 percent of customers (37000 individuals) chose to participate in this program. The evidence shows that only about 50 percent of contributors reach the minimum amount for the co-contribution, but that participants persist in contributing even if they failed to contribute the minimum amount in a given year. While this paper does not provide causal estimates, it does present evidence of considerable interest among the informal sector in a state-run voluntary pension program in a emerging market where access to formal finance is otherwise poor.