Background Despite the adoption of strict infection prevention and control measures, many hospitals have reported outbreaks of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDRO) during the Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Following an outbreak of carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (CRAB) in our institution, we sought to systematically analyse characteristics of MDRO outbreaks in times of COVID-19, focussing on contributing factors and specific challenges in controlling these outbreaks. Methods We describe results of our own CRAB outbreak investigation and performed a systematic literature review for MDRO (including Candida auris) outbreaks which occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic (between December 2019 and March 2021). Search terms were related to pathogens/resistance mechanisms AND COVID-19. We summarized outbreak characteristics in a narrative synthesis and contrasted contributing factors with implemented control measures. Results The CRAB outbreak occurred in our intensive care units between September and December 2020 and comprised 10 patients (thereof seven with COVID-19) within two distinct genetic clusters (both ST2 carrying OXA-23). Both clusters presumably originated from COVID-19 patients transferred from the Balkans. Including our outbreak, we identified 17 reports, mostly caused by Candida auris (n = 6) or CRAB (n = 5), with an overall patient mortality of 35% (68/193). All outbreaks involved intensive care settings. Non-adherence to personal protective equipment (PPE) or hand hygiene (n = 11), PPE shortage (n = 8) and high antibiotic use (n = 8) were most commonly reported as contributing factors, followed by environmental contamination (n = 7), prolonged critical illness (n = 7) and lack of trained HCW (n = 7). Implemented measures mainly focussed on PPE/hand hygiene audits (n = 9), environmental cleaning/disinfection (n = 9) and enhanced patient screening (n = 8). Comparing potentially modifiable risk factors and control measures, we found the largest discrepancies in the areas of PPE shortage (risk factor in 8 studies, addressed in 2 studies) and patient overcrowding (risk factor in 5 studies, addressed in 0 studies). Conclusions Reported MDRO outbreaks during the COVID-19 pandemic were most often caused by CRAB (including our outbreak) and C. auris. Inadequate PPE/hand hygiene adherence, PPE shortage, and high antibiotic use were the most commonly reported potentially modifiable factors contributing to the outbreaks. These findings should be considered for the prevention of MDRO outbreaks during future COVID-19 waves.

Objectives Conestat alfa, a recombinant human C1 esterase inhibitor, is a multi-target inhibitor of inflammatory cascades including the complement, the kinin-kallikrein and the contact activation system. The study objective is to investigate the efficacy and safety of conestat alfa in improving disease severity and short-term outcome in COVID-19 patients with pulmonary disease. Trial design This study is an investigator-initiated, randomized (2:1 ratio), open-label, parallel-group, controlled, multi-center, phase 2a clinical trial. Participants This trial is conducted in 3 hospitals in Switzerland, 1 hospital in Brazil and 1 hospital in Mexico (academic and non-academic). All patients with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection requiring hospitalization for at least 3 calendar days for severe COVID-19 will be screened for study eligibility. Inclusion criteria: - Signed informed consent - Age 18-85 years - Evidence of pulmonary involvement on CT scan or X-ray of the chest - Duration of symptoms associated with COVID-19 ≤ 10 days - At least one of the following risk factors for progression to mechanical ventilation on the day of enrolment: 1) Arterial hypertension 2) ≥ 50 years 3) Obesity (BMI ≥ 30 kg/m2) 4) History of cardiovascular disease 5) Chronic pulmonary disease 6) Chronic renal disease 7) C-reactive protein > 35mg/L 8) Oxygen saturation at rest of ≤ 94% when breathing ambient air Exclusion criteria: - Incapacity or inability to provide informed consent - Contraindications to the class of drugs under investigation (C1 esterase inhibitor) - Treatment with tocilizumab or another IL-6R or IL-6 inhibitor before enrolment - History or suspicion of allergy to rabbits - Pregnancy or breast feeding - Active or anticipated treatment with any other complement inhibitor - Liver cirrhosis (any Child-Pugh score) - Admission to an ICU on the day or anticipated within the next 24 hours of enrolment - Invasive or non-invasive ventilation - Participation in another study with any investigational drug within the 30 days prior to enrolment - Enrolment of the study investigators, their family members, employees and other closely related or dependent persons Intervention and comparator Patients randomized to the experimental arm will receive conestat alfa in addition to standard of care (SOC). Conestat alfa (8400 U followed by 4200 U every 8 hours) will be administered as a slow intravenous injection (5-10 minutes) over a 72-hour period (i.e. 9 administrations in total). The first conestat alfa treatment will be administered on the day of enrolment. The control group will receive SOC only. SOC treatment will be administered according to local institutional guidelines, including supplemental oxygen, antibiotics, corticosteroids, remdesivir, and anticoagulation. Main outcomes The primary endpoint of this trial is disease severity on day 7 after enrolment assessed by an adapted WHO Ordinal Scale for Clinical Improvement (score 0 will be omitted and score 6 and 7 will be combined) from 1 (no limitation of activities) to 7 (death). Secondary outcomes include (i) the time to clinical improvement (time from randomization to an improvement of two points on the WHO ordinal scale or discharge from hospital) within 14 days after enrolment, (ii) the proportion of participants alive and not having required invasive or non-invasive ventilation at 14 days after enrolment and (iii) the proportion of subjects without an acute lung injury (defined by PaO2/FiO2 ratio of ≤300mmHg) within 14 days after enrolment. Exploratory outcomes include virological clearance, C1 esterase inhibitor pharmacokinetics and changes in routine laboratory parameters and inflammatory proteins. Randomisation Subjects will be randomised in a 2:1 ratio to treatment with conestat alfa in addition to SOC or SOC only. Randomization is performed via an interactive web response system (SecuTrial®). Blinding (masking) In this open-label trial, participants, caregivers and outcome assessors are not blinded to group assignment. Numbers to be randomised (sample size) We will randomise approximately 120 individuals (80 in the active treatment arm, 40 in the SOC group). Two interim analyses after 40 and 80 patients are planned according to the Pocock adjusted levels αp = 0.0221. The results of the interim analysis will allow adjustment of the sample size (Lehmacher, Wassmer, 1999). Trial Status PROTECT-COVID-19 protocol version 3.0 (July 07 2020). Participant recruitment started on July 30 2020 in one center (Basel, Switzerland, first participant included on August 06 2020). In four of five study centers patients are actively recruited. Participation of the fifth study center (Mexico) is anticipated by mid December 2020. Completion of trial recruitment depends on the development of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Trial registration Clinicaltrials.gov, number: NCT04414631, registered on 4 June 2020 Full protocol The full protocol is attached as an additional file, accessible from the Trials website (Additional file 1). In the interest of expediting dissemination of this material, the familiar formatting has been eliminated; this Letter serves as a summary of the key elements of the full protocol.

Background There is insufficient evidence regarding the role of respirators in the prevention of SARS-CoV-2 infection. We analysed the impact of filtering facepiece class 2 (FFP2) versus surgical masks on the risk of SARS-CoV-2 acquisition among Swiss healthcare workers (HCW). Methods Our prospective multicentre cohort enrolled HCW from June to August 2020. Participants were asked about COVID-19 risk exposures/behaviours, including preferentially worn mask type when caring for COVID-19 patients outside of aerosol-generating procedures. The impact of FFP2 on (1) self-reported SARS-CoV-2-positive nasopharyngeal PCR/rapid antigen tests captured during weekly surveys, and (2) SARS-CoV-2 seroconversion between baseline and January/February 2021 was assessed. Results We enrolled 3259 participants from nine healthcare institutions, whereof 716 (22%) preferentially used FFP2. Among these, 81/716 (11%) reported a SARS-CoV-2-positive swab, compared to 352/2543 (14%) surgical mask users; seroconversion was documented in 85/656 (13%) FFP2 and 426/2255 (19%) surgical mask users. Adjusted for baseline characteristics, COVID-19 exposure, and risk behaviour, FFP2 use was non-significantly associated with decreased risk for SARS-CoV-2-positive swab (adjusted hazard ratio [aHR] 0.8, 95% CI 0.6–1.0) and seroconversion (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] 0.7, 95% CI 0.5–1.0); household exposure was the strongest risk factor (aHR 10.1, 95% CI 7.5–13.5; aOR 5.0, 95% CI 3.9–6.5). In subgroup analysis, FFP2 use was clearly protective among those with frequent (> 20 patients) COVID-19 exposure (aHR 0.7 for positive swab, 95% CI 0.5–0.8; aOR 0.6 for seroconversion, 95% CI 0.4–1.0). Conclusions Respirators compared to surgical masks may convey additional protection from SARS-CoV-2 for HCW with frequent exposure to COVID-19 patients.

Background There is insufficient evidence regarding the role of respirators in the prevention of SARS-CoV-2 infection. We analysed the impact of filtering facepiece class 2 (FFP2) vs. surgical masks on the risk of SARS-CoV-2 acquisition among Swiss healthcare workers (HCW). Methods Our prospective multicentre cohort enrolled patient-facing HCWs from June to August 2020. Participants were asked about COVID-19 risk exposures/behaviours, including preferred mask type when caring for COVID-19 patients outside of aerosol-generating procedures (AGP). For those performing AGPs, we asked whether they used FFP2 irrespective of the patients COVID-19 status (i.e. universal use). The impact of FFP2 on i) self-reported SARS-CoV-2-positive nasopharyngeal PCR/rapid antigen tests captured during weekly surveys, and ii) SARS-CoV-2 seroconversion between baseline and January/February 2021 was assessed. Results We enrolled 3259 participants from nine healthcare institutions, whereof 716 (22%) preferentially used FFP2 respirators. Among these, 81/716 (11%) reported a SARS-CoV-2-positive swab, compared to 352/2543 (14%) surgical mask users (median follow-up 242 days); seroconversion was documented in 85/656 (13%) FFP2 and 426/2255 (19%) surgical mask users. Adjusted for baseline characteristics, COVID-19 exposure, and risk behaviour, FFP2 use was non-significantly associated with a decreased risk for SARS-CoV-2-positive swab (adjusted hazard ratio [aHR] 0.8, 95% CI 0.6-1.0, p=0.052) and seroconversion (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] 0.7, 95% CI 0.5-1.0, p=0.053); household exposure was the strongest risk factor (aHR for positive swab 10.1, p<0.001; aOR for seroconversion 5.0, p<0.001). In subgroup analysis, FFP2 use was clearly protective among those with frequent (>20 patients) COVID-19 exposure (aHR 0.7, p<0.001; aOR 0.6, p=0.035). Universal FFP2 use during AGPs showed no protective effect (aHR 1.1, p=0.7; aOR 0.9, p=0.53). Conclusion Respirators compared to surgical masks may convey additional protection from SARS-CoV-2 for HCW with frequent exposure to COVID-19 patients.

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic made its way from private, public, and work spaces into healthcare systems all over the world, imposing an unexpected burden on global health care. COVID-19 outbreaks in acute-care hospitals are a frequent problem, increasing morbidity and mortality among patients and leading to staff shortages. 1,2 Prevention of nosocomial severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) transmission in acute-care hospitals represents a major challenge. One important reason is that diagnosis in asymptomatic or presymptomatic patients and healthcare workers (HCWs) is often delayed. 3 Also, understaffing during the pandemic may decrease adherence to standard hygiene measures. 4 Before the SARS-CoV-2 vaccine became available, we observed several wards with nosocomial COVID-19 outbreaks, whereas others were spared. We sought to identify ward-level risk factors associated with nosocomial COVID-19 outbreaks. MethodsWe conducted a matched case-control study in our 700-bed tertiary-care center during the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. Infection prevention and control (IPC) measures consisted of the use of personal protective equipment (PPE), social distancing, placing confirmed cases in cohorts, and visitor restrictions. Routine testing of asymptomatic HCWs was not implemented. We defined nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks as the occurrence of ≥2 patients with nosocomial infection within a 14-day period on the same ward. Nosocomial infection was defined as a positive SARS-CoV-2 test on day 5 or later of hospital admission. Wards with at least 1 nosocomial outbreak between July and December 2020 were defined as outbreak wards. Wards without outbreaks served as controls. Intensive care units and designated COVID-19 wards were excluded. Ward matching was done 1:1 for approximate number of beds (±10) and time of the outbreak by choosing the same period of investigation on control and outbreak wards. The beginning of an outbreak was defined as the day