Environmental SEM tribometry of the pressureless-sintered Hexoloy a-SiC ceramics was continued in 0.2 and 3.4 Torr partial pressures of oxygen (P0 2) at room temperature (RT) to 950°C, coupled with after-test SEM photomicrography and AES/XPS surface analyses of the wear scars and the adjacent (unused) surfaces. The results show some correlation in the somewhat improved friction behavior of both the previously tested CERCOM SiC-B in partial pressures of oxygen compared to vacuum, especially when the slower tribo-oxidation kinetics and the surface-oxide-induced reduction in grain pull-out of the boron/carbon-pressed Hexoloy are taken into account. Even in the presence of the thickest lubricating film formed at the 3.4 Torr P 0 2 , the COF still did not become reduced below-0.2 (and the MAX.COF below 0.3). These values are an order-of-magnitude higher than those of the polished PCD. The same observation was made with the SiC-B previously. The wear rate of Hexoloy is only slightly (albeit consistently) less in oxygen than that of the SiC-B, with both in the 10'mW/N.m range (an order-of-magnitude greater than PCD). Considering the overall tribological behavior of both a-SiC materials, neither is able to serve better than PCD in MEMS moving mechanical assembly applications intended for extreme environments. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES MEMS, poly-XTL ax-SiC, friction, wear, SEM tribometry, vacuum, oxygen partial pressures, high temperatures, SEM/AES/XPS analyses, dangling bonds 16. PRICE CODE re(de)construction, graphitization, gas-phase lubrication. 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. nformation is a strategic asset. Without it, the organizations and the operations they undertake have little chance of success. As DoD's Chief Information Officer, I am working to ensure that our forces have the access to the information they need, when and where they need it. It is equally important that they also have the capability to share information and to collaborate with the individuals and organizations they must work with to successfully plan and carry out operations. This will ensure that they will have the ability to take what information they need while being able to contribute what they know. The result will be an organization that can bring all available information to bear. REPORT DATE APR 20072Complex endeavors such as Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction missions are now the business of DoD. As this latest book from the CCRP explains, we can no longer be content with building an "enterprise-wide" network that stops at the edges of our forces, nor with a set of information sources and channels that are purely military in nature. We need to be able to work with a large and diverse set of entities and information sources. We also need to develop new approaches to I x planning that are better suited for these coalition operations. The implications are significant for a CIO as it greatly expands the who, the what, and the how of information sharing and collaboration. It also requires a new way of thinking about effectiveness, increasing the emphasis we place on agility, which, as is explained in this book, is the necessary response to uncertainty and complexity.As the authors point out, by committing ourselves to a network-centric transformation, the DoD is already on the right path. Such a transformation is changing the way we plan and conduct operations, making us both more effective and more agile. Our forces and our allies are taking the lessons learned from ongoing operations and, with a network-centric mindset, are developing new approaches to command and control, organization, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. What these new approaches have in common is that they are predicated upon a robust, global, secure, and trusted set of information capabilities.We...

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Summary• On one level, Information Warfare (IW) and deterrence are well matched, but on other levels the two topics can be seen as orders of magnitude apart. IW covers a huge domain while deterrence is a narrow topic. Their relationship is spotty-highly relevant on some topics, marginally so on others, and not at all relevant in many areas.• The term "information warfare" typically focuses on the military or cyber-war domains dominated by computers. This narrow definition is inconsistent with the broad policy questions relevant to IW, its impact from cooperation to competition and conflict, and the key role of information media.• Deterrence is part of IW only when the attacker is known (or can be discovered), the defender has a credible capability to threaten important interests of the attacker, and the attacker cannot defend those interests.• Participants argued that a visible set of defenses is the beginning point for deterring attacks on important computer systems. Attacks are essentially instrumental acts that will not occur if the attacking party perceives little opportunity for success.• Media warfare (i.e., countering an adversary's propaganda) can put enormous time pressure on decisionmakers, particularly when an authoritarian state adversary, with little or no necessity for consultation, targets unsuspecting, easily manipulated publics.• Information warfare attacks on the United States are presently deterred by the same policy that deters other types of attack. Acting under its rights as a sovereign state, the United States stands ready to respond to any attack on its interests with all appropriate means, including law enforcement as well as military capacity.

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