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As bank regulatory reform tries to come to grips with the lessons of the financial crisis, several experts have proposed that some form of contingent convertible debt (CoCo) requirement be added to the prudential regulatory toolkit. In this article, the authors show how properly designed CoCos can be used not just to absorb losses, but more importantly to encourage banks to recognize losses and replace lost equity in a timely way, as well as to manage risk more effectively. Their proposed CoCos requirement strengthens management's incentives to promptly replace lost capital and enhance risk management by imposing major costs on the managers and existing shareholders of banks that fail to do so. Key elements of the proposal are that conversion of the CoCos into equity would be (1) triggered at a high trigger ratio of equity to assets (long before the bank is near an insolvency point), (2) determined by a market trigger (using a 90‐day moving average market equity ratio) rather than by supervisory discretion, and (3) significantly dilutive to shareholders. The only clear way for bank managements to avoid such dilution would be to issue equity into the market. Under most circumstances—barring an extremely rapid plunge of a bank's financial condition—management should be able and eager to replace lost capital in a timely way; as a result, dilutive conversions should almost never occur. Banks would face strong incentives to maintain high ratios of true economic capital relative to risky assets, and to manage their risks effectively. This implies that “too‐big‐to‐fail” financial institutions would not be permitted to approach the point of insolvency; they would face strong incentives to recapitalize long before that point. And if they should fail to issue new equity in a timely manner, the CoCos conversion would provide an alternative means of recapitalizing banks well before they reach the brink of insolvency. Thus, a CoCos requirement would go a long way to resolving the “too‐big‐to‐fail” problem. Such a CoCos requirement would not only increase the effectiveness of regulation, but also reduce its cost. It would be less costly for banks to raise CoCos than equity, reflecting both the lower adverseselection costs of CoCos issuance and the potential tax advantages of debt. And precisely because of the low probability of CoCo conversion, the Cocos would be issued at relatively modest (if any) discounts to otherwise comparable but straight subordinated debt. Thus requiring a mix of equity and appropriately designed CoCos would be less costly to banks, and would entail less of a reduction in the supply of loans than would a much higher book equity requirement alone.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may PREFACEThe ADB Institute aims to explore the most appropriate development paradigms for Asia composed of well-balanced combinations of the roles of markets, institutions, and governments in the post-crisis period.Under this broad research project on development paradigms, the ADB Institute Working Paper Series will contribute to disseminating works-in-progress as a building block of the project and will invite comments and questions.I trust that this series will provoke constructive discussions among policymakers as well as researchers about where Asian economies should go from the last crisis and current recovery. ABSTRACTAlthough the growing literature on the importance of finance in economic growth contrasts bank-based financial systems with market-based financial systems, little attention has been paid to the role of the bond market. Correspondingly the role of the bond market has been very small relative to that of the banking system or equity markets in most Asian emerging economies. We argue that the underdevelopment of Asian bond markets has undermined the efficiency of these economies and made them significantly more vulnerable to financial crises.We begin by describing the role of financial markets and institutions in economic development.We show that the underdevelopment of capital markets limits risk-pooling and risk-sharing opportunities for both households and firms. The weak financial infrastructures that characterize many Asian economies are shown to inhibit the development of bond markets relative to equity markets.The consequences of operating a financial system with a banking sector and equity market, but without a well-functioning bond market are profound and far ranging. Without a market-determined interest rate, firms will lack a true measure of the opportunity cost of capital and will invest inefficiently. Opportunities for hedging financial risks will be constrained. Savers will have less attractive portfolio investment choices and, consequently, fewer savings may be mobilized by the financial system to fund investment. Firms may face a higher effective cost of funds and their investment policies may be biased in favor of short-term assets and away from entrepreneurial ventures. Firms may take excessive foreign exchange risks in an attempt to compensate for the lack of domestic bond markets by borrowing abroad. In addition, the banking sector will be larger than it would otherwise be. Since...

We develop a model of lender behavior in the presence of default risk and moral hazard that determines default premiums and identifies the conditions under which borrowers are rationed. A hypothesis regarding a cognitive bias in the formation of expectations provides a dynamic component to our analysis and allows us to explain how an economy becomes vulnerable to a financial crisis and why vulnerability may increase over time.

The financial crisis of 2007-2009 revealed that the corporate complexity of most of the Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) presented a formidable obstacle to any plausible orderly resolution of these institutions. This paper documents the extent of this complexity making use of an historical time series, developed by the authors, that shows the evolution of the number of majority-owned subsidiaries of G-SIBs over time. After a very significant increase in complexity before the crisis and until 2011, this trend may be reversing, possibly in response to regulatory and market pressures on banks since then. Nonetheless the reduction in complexity has been uneven across institutions and may not persist. The econometric analysis of this new set of panel data produces two key results with relevant policy implications: first, the relationship found in previous studies between the number of subsidiaries and bank size loses significance when time effects are introduced; second, large mergers and acquisitions are a key driver of complexity and their effect remains significant even when time effects are considered.