In this article we suggest that events and contexts relevant to the initiation and regulation of intentional behavior can function either to support autonomy (i.e., to promote choice) or to control behavior (i.e., to pressure one toward specific outcomes). Research herein reviewed indicates that this distinction is relevant to specific external events and to general interpersonal contexts as well as to specific internal events and to general personality orientations. That is, the distinction is relevant whether one's analysis focuses on social psychological variables or on personality variables. The research review details those contextual and person factors that tend to promote autonomy and those that tend to control. Furthermore, it shows that autonomy support has generally been associated with more intrinsic motivation, greater interest, less pressure and tension, more creativity, more cognitive flexibility, better conceptual learning, a more positive emotional tone, higher self-esteem, more trust, greater persistence of behavior change, and better physical and psychological health than has control. Also, these results have converged across different assessment procedures, different research methods, and different subject populations. On the basis or these results, we present an organismic perspective in which we argue that the regulation of intentional behavior varies along a continuum from autonomous (i.e.. self-determined) to controlled. The relation of this organismic perspective to historical developments in empirical psychology is discussed, with a particular emphasis on its implications for the study of social psychology and personality. For several decades American psychology was dominated by associationist theories. Assuming that behavior is controlled by peripheral mechanisms, these theories held that the initiation of behavior is a function of stimulus inputs such as external contingencies of reinforcement (Skinner, 1953) or internal drive stimulations (Hull, 1943) and that the regulation of behavior is a function of associative bonds between inputs and behaviors that develop through reinforcement processes. With that general perspective, the central processing of information was not part of the explanatory system, so concepts such as intention were considered irrelevant to the determination of behavior. During the 1950s and 1960s, associationist theories gave way to cognitive theories in which the processing of information was assumed to play an important role in the determination of behavior. On the basis of this assumption, the initiation of behavior was theorized to be a function of expectations about behavior-outcome contingencies and of the psychological value of outcomes (e.g., Atkinson, 1964; Tolman, 1959; Vroom, 1964), and the regulation of behavior was seen as a process of comparing one's current state to a standard (i.e., the desired outcome) and then acting to reduce the discrepancy (e.g., Kanfer, 1975; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960). Thus, the cognitive perspective shifted the focus...

Little children love to play and to learn. They are active, curious, and eager to engage their environments, and when they do they learn. To some extent adults also love to play and to learn. When people are playing and learning in this eager and willing way, they are intrinsically motivated. Throughout life, when they are in their healthiest states, they are active and interested, and the intrinsically motivated behaviors that result help them acquire knowledge about themselves and their world.

Few things are more intrinsically motivating than the opportunity to test one's ideas against the challenges provided by other theorists and researchers. In writing the target article we invited such challenges by contrasting our work with other current theories and by making clear, and sometimes controversial, claims. Accordingly, we looked forward to the commentaries with great excitement, mixed with a bit of anxiety, anticipating strong and pointed arguments, which we believe to be the best nutriment for continued theoretical growth.After reviewing the range of comments, we feel appreciative. The comments are indeed pointed, and provoked us to specify our propositions and predictions even further and to make even more direct comparisons with the assumptions and foci of other theories that were used in the commentaries. In several instances the comments suggested specific new ideas and testable hypotheses that have the potential to spawn informative research. Each of the 11 commentaries seriously engaged the self-determination theory (SDT) framework in the spirit of scientific dialog, at times critically and with the fervor that often characterizes an active and socially relevant field of human inquiry. Among the major themes we address in our response are the following: Psychological Inquiry

Vitality, or the energy available to the self, is a salient and functionally significant indicator of health and motivation. Previous models (e.g., Baumeister & Vohs, 2007) have suggested how such energy can be depleted but have focused less on how it can be maintained or enhanced. In this article, we describe a model of energy and vitality based on self‐determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000). We review substantial evidence that, whereas the self‐controlling regulation of behavior depletes vitality and energy, the autonomous self‐regulation of behavior does not. A growing number of experimental and field studies also suggest that vitality and energy are enhanced by activities that satisfy basic psychological needs for relatedness, competence, and autonomy. Lifestyles focused on extrinsic goals are less conducive to need satisfaction and thus engender less vitality. We conclude that social psychological factors associated with need satisfaction have important implications for health and vitality and for informing interventions.

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