Slife and Williams present a compelling and potentially controversial look at the implicit underpinnings of behavioral research. The do an admirable job of specifically describing the 'embedded ideas' of some of the most commonly accepted behavioral theories.. .. Well written, concise, and well thought out; arguments are made in readable fashion, suitable for scholar and nonscholar alike."-Choice "The manuscript completely captivated me around the middle of Chapter 2 with 'Eclectic Theories,' where I began reading with absorption in order to process ideas for myself, instead of reading on the surface to see what the author was about. Again and again I found myself pausing to contemplate provocative one-liners.. .. Throughout, the philosophical inquiry seems to me profound and enchanting, with an original and compelling synthesis."-Maria Arrigo, Psychology Graduate Student, Claremont Graduate School "These authors have an uncanny ability of identifying, as they would say, 'hidden' issues and assumptions that permeate the behavioral sciences. The arguments they marshall are most compelling and deserving of serious consideration by devoted professionals, students, or lay persons. Hopefully, with the publication of the book such consideration will at long last be realized."-Jeffrey P. Lindstrom, Fontbonne College, Missouri "This book will stimulate more dialogue; it is long overdue. Thanks to the lucid writing style, sensible organization, and occasional recapitulations in the text, the book will also be accessible to advanced undergraduates and graduates. I plan to require the book in at least one of my courses."-Allan W. Wicker, Center for Organizational and Behavioral Science, The Claremont Graduate School "This book is important for cultivating a view of behavioral sciences as something far more important than a collection of techniques for gathering and analyzing data. I would recommend it to my colleagues in educational psychology who teach psychological foundations."-Thomas A. Schwandt, School of Education, Indiana University "To my mind, the finest feature of this book-at the level of a near miracle-is the author's clear and engaging explanation of complex, subtle, and counter-intuitive ideas. This amazing pedagogical achievement should stand as an example to philosophers. I am also struck by the author's affection for the reader. The prose is simple because the author wants to make a real connection with the reader; there is no feeling of condescension for the novice or the commercial market. It is a loving instead of a battering style of philosophical disclosure, which did not occur to the philosophical giants whose works the author mercifully interprets for the reader."-Maria Arrigo, Psychology Graduate Student, Claremont Graduate School "Each chapter consistently follows a similar outline. Introductions and conclusions genuinely assist the reader, as do references back to earlier segments. Daily life examples bring the text to life. The book is designed to engage the reader. Addressing the root metaphor o...

Large catchment basins may be viewed as ecosystems in which natural and cultural attributes interact. Contemporary river ecology emphasizes the four‐dimensional nature of the river continuum and the propensity for riverine biodiversity and bioproduction to be largely controlled by habitat maintenance processes, such as cut and fill alluviation mediated by catchment water yield. Stream regulation reduces annual flow amplitude, increases baseflow variation and changes temperature, mass transport and other important biophysical patterns and attributes. As a result, ecological connectivity between upstream and downstream reaches and between channels, ground waters and floodplains may be severed. Native biodiversity and bioproduction usually are reduced or changed and non‐native biota proliferate.  Regulated rivers regain normative attributes as distance from the dam increases and in relation to the mode of dam operation. Therefore, dam operations can be used to restructure altered temperature and flow regimes which, coupled with pollution abatement and management of non‐native biota, enables natural processes to restore damaged habitats along the river's course. The expectation is recovery of depressed populations of native species. The protocol requires: restoring peak flows needed to reconnect and periodically reconfigure channel and floodplain habitats; stabilizing baseflows to revitalize food‐webs in shallow water habitats; reconstituting seasonal temperature patterns (e.g. by construction of depth selective withdrawal systems on storage dams); maximizing dam passage to allow recovery of fish metapopulation structure; instituting a management belief system that relies upon natural habitat restoration and maintenance, as opposed to artificial propagation, installation of artificial instream structures (river engineering) and predator control; and, practising adaptive ecosystem management.  Our restoration protocol should be viewed as an hypothesis derived from the principles of river ecology. Although restoration to aboriginal state is not expected, nor necessarily desired, recovering some large portion of the lost capacity to sustain native biodiversity and bioproduction is possible by management for processes that maintain normative habitat conditions. The cost may be less than expected because the river can do most of the work.

Large catchment basins may be viewed as ecosystems in which natural and cultural attributes interact. Contemporary river ecology emphasizes the four-dimensional nature of the river continuum and the propensity for riverine biodiversity and bioproduction to be largely controlled by habitat maintenance processes, such as cut and fill alluviation mediated by catchment water yield. Stream regulation reduces annual flow amplitude, increases baseflow variation and changes temperature, mass transport and other important biophysical patterns and attributes. As a result, ecological connectivity between upstream and downstream reaches and between channels, ground waters and floodplains may be severed. Native biodiversity and bioproduction usually are reduced or changed and non-native biota proliferate. Regulated rivers regain normative attributes as distance from the dam increases and in relation to the mode of dam operation. Therefore, dam operations can be used to restructure altered temperature and flow regimes which, coupled with pollution abatement and management of non-native biota, enables natural processes to restore damaged habitats along the river's course. The expectation is recovery of depressed populations of native species. The protocol requires: restoring peak flows needed to reconnect and periodically reconfigure channel and floodplain habitats; stabilizing baseflows to revitalize food-webs in shallow water habitats; reconstituting seasonal temperature patterns (e.g. by construction of depth selective withdrawal systems on storage dams); maximizing dam passage to allow recovery of fish metapopulation structure; instituting a management belief system that relies upon natural habitat restoration and maintenance, as opposed to artificial propagation, installation of artificial instream structures (river engineering) and predator control; and, practising adaptive ecosystem management. Our restoration protocol should be viewed as an hypothesis derived from the principles of river ecology. Although restoration to aboriginal state is not expected, nor necessarily desired, recovering some large portion of the lost capacity to sustain native biodiversity and bioproduction is possible by management for processes that maintain normative habitat conditions. The cost may be less than expected because the river can do most of the work.

The purpose of this article is (a) to promote careful consideration of a new subdiscipline called theoretical psychology and (b) to invite psychology's evaluation of its own scholarly and intellectual status. Increased signs of disciplinary fragmentation as well as threats to mainstream psychology's philosophy of science have presented challenges that call for thoughtful disciplinary discussion. The authors propose the formal recognition of a subdiscipline whose role is to facilitate this discussion. At the local level, theoretical psychologists should fill a role as consultants to their organization or department, similar to that of statisticians and methodologists. Researchers and practitioners WOUld consult with theoreticians about the types of explanations and methods they are using to see if these approaches are coherent, hold hidden problems, and are appropriate to the assumptions being made. Many psychologists already perform these roles, using a variety of supporting journals, organizations, and institutions. These supports are briefly reviewed, along with anticipated objections to this role and possible considerations for training these professionals. l•pfl•s article responds affirmatively to the question sed in the rifle. Although we attempt to present main arguments for and against the formal recognition of this subdiscipline, our view is that the arguments in favor far outweigh the arguments against. In short, we feel that this is an idea whose time has come. However, we are not naive enough to think that our proposal will not generate considerable controversy. On the contrary, the question of a theoretical subdiscipline raises all sorts of issues that go to the core of the discipline as a whole. Consequently, the question we raise is important to consider not only for the obvious reasons regarding the need for a new subdiscipline (or the need for subdisciplines at all) but also for the inevitable disciplinary selfevaluation this question engenders. From our perspective, this evaluation is precisely why a subdiscipline of theoretical psychology is needed.We begin by attempting to situate the question historically. A historical question related to the title question is as follows: Why has there not been a formally recognized subdiscipline of theoretical psychology to this point? As we show, psychology's stake in being recognized as a science, as well as its particular philosophy of science, is an important part of the answer to this question. Another issue that appears to be embedded in ttie title question is as follows: Why propose a subdiscipline O f theoretical psychology atthis point? We attempt to demonstrate that the philosophy of science long embraced by the discipline, and perhaps even our disciplinary identity, is changing. Part of tl~ purpose of theoretical psychology is to understand this change and to provide informed and formal discourse about what psychology may be changing to.Furthermore, issues that psychology must confront in the current intellectual climate argue for a formal subdisc...

The issue of human agency has been confused with the question of determinism versus indeterminism. The author takes the position that to argue for agency is not necessarily to argue for indeterminism. Once the agentive position is freed from the burden of indeterminism, it becomes a serious possibility. It is further argued that the notion of freedom as choice from among alternatives is conceptually flawed. A conception of freedom as "having the world truthfully" is presented as an alternative to freedom conceived as choice. This view of agency, drawing chiefly on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas, suggests that the proper grounding for the understanding of human freedom is in morality, rather than in the "metaphysic of things."