This article reports on the effect of income within race on African Americans' perception of the courts. Our findings are somewhat consistent with the previous research on black middle-class relative dissatisfaction with various American institutions. That is, unlike whites and Latirios in our study, we find that higher-income African Americans are more skeptical of the notion that blacks receive equal treatment in the courts. This same group also reported less confidence in the court's handling of specific types of cases (e.g., civil, criminal and juvenile delinquency cases.) However, better off blacks were more likely than poor blacks to have confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court and community courts. These findings point a more complex account of African American perceptions of the courts, an account that draws a distinction between diffused and specific support of the courts.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractMany partnership contracts (and other joint-venture agreements) include so-called "Texas Shootout Clauses" to govern future breakups. In a Texas Shootout, one partner names a single buy-sell price and the other partner has the option to buy or sell at that price. While the prior literature has considered the allocative efficiency of the Texas Shootout, this paper focuses on the incentives of private parties to make these offers to begin with. We consider a model where sole ownership is more efficient than joint ownership. Although both partners are equally capable, one has private information about the common value of the asset. When given the choice, they avoid making buy-sell offers because these offers give away bargaining surplus (the partners are "gun shy"). Instead, they often (but not always) prefer to make simple offers to buy or simple offers to sell and bargaining failures arise. Texas Shootout contracts that assign trigger rights -where one party can force the other to name a price -increase efficiency and are jointly desirable.2