The current study investigated cultural and psychological factors associated with intentions to reduce the spread of COVID‐19. Participants ( n = 704) completed measures of individualism–collectivism, belief in conspiracy theories about COVID‐19, feelings of powerlessness, and intentions to engage in behaviours that reduce the spread of COVID‐19. Results revealed that vertical individualism negatively predicted intentions to engage in social distancing, directly and indirectly through both belief in COVID‐19 conspiracy theories and feelings of powerlessness. Vertical collectivism positively predicted social distancing intentions directly. Horizontal collectivism positively predicted social distancing intentions indirectly through feelings of powerlessness. Finally, horizontal collectivism positively predicted hygiene‐related intentions both directly and indirectly through lower feelings of powerlessness. These findings suggest that promoting collectivism may be a way to increase engagement with efforts to reduce the spread of COVID‐19. They also highlight the importance of examining the interplay between culture and both personal feelings (powerlessness) and information consumption (conspiracy theories) during times of crisis.

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The present research empirically examines how different types of coping strategies are associated with belief in conspiracy theories. Conspiracy beliefs have been linked to the frustration of basic needs and seem to increase during major world events that evoke stress. Thus, we hypothesized that they may serve as a psychological response to maladaptive coping strategies. This hypothesis was tested among British participants and conceptually replicated across three studies. Cross‐sectionally, we examined coping strategies (i.e., self‐sufficient, social‐support, avoidance, and religious) and belief in a specific conspiracy theory (Study 1, n = 199) and belief in general notions of conspiracy (Study 2, n = 411). In Study 3 (n = 398), we experimentally primed different coping styles via a mnemonic recollection procedure and measured belief in notions of conspiracy. Avoidance coping (recognized as being maladaptive and leading to at least temporary disengagement and abandonment of goal‐related behaviours) positively predicted belief in conspiracy theories (Studies 1 and 2). In Study 3, priming avoidance coping (vs. self‐sufficient coping or no coping strategy) significantly increased belief in conspiracy theories. These findings suggest that using maladaptive coping strategies (either dispositional or situationally induced) may foster conspiracy beliefs.

In the current systematic review and meta-analyses, we aimed to synthesise the relationships between psychological motives and conspiracy beliefs. We focused on epistemic concerns for understanding and knowledge (k = 114, Nobv = 361; Nparticipants = 48,697), existential threats to security (k = 121, Nobv = 414; Nparticipants = 51,517.30), and social needs to defend the self- and group image (k = 100, Nobv = 201; Nparticipants = 34,241.30). Results indicated that conspiracy beliefs are related to epistemic concerns, demonstrated through a reliance on automatic thinking styles and compensation for experiences of epistemic uncertainty. Furthermore, we showed that low cognitive abilities, existential threats (both ongoing personal distress and perceived threats from the world around us), and social needs to maintain interpersonal bonds and defend the self- and group image can explain the formation of conspiracy beliefs. Among other findings, moderation analyses revealed that defensive ingroup identity is only linked to conspiracy measures that capture belief in specific conspiracy theories, but not more general measures of conspiracy mentality. Our findings support the notion that conspiracy beliefs appeal to certain psychological motives. We discuss limitations and avenues for future research. We also discuss the implications of the current findings for efforts to extend theoretical considerations in the literature, pinpointing particularly influential variables and providing recommendations on which to base interventions that reduce susceptibility to conspiracy beliefs.

Recent empirical and theoretical developments suggest that endorsement of conspiracy theories can arise from the frustration of social motives. Taking this further, the current review integrates theorising on processes relating to three selves-the individual, relational, and collective self and outlines their associations with conspiracy beliefs. In doing so, we argue that motives pertaining to the individual self (e.g., narcissism, need for uniqueness) are linked to belief in conspiracy theories to deflect blame from personal shortcomings and protect the self-image. Motives responding to threats to the relational self (e.g., social exclusion) increase endorsement of conspiracy theories to regain a sense of social support through exchanging shared concerns. Finally, collective self motives (e.g., collective narcissism, perceived ingroup victimhood) foster conspiracy beliefs to defend the group image by blaming outgroups for ingroup misfortunes and placing one's group in a morally superior victim role. Taken together, endorsement of conspiracy theories appears to be borne out of attempts to manage these three selves.Potential consequences for each of the selves, future directions, and theoretical implications are discussed.