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Research Question/Issue: We systematically review the corporate governance (CG) literature on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), organize it into six main themes and their subthemes, and propose several opportunities for future research.Research Findings/Insights: We highlight CG's unique characteristics in the MENA region as well as differences and similarities across MENA countries. We shed light on how organizations are governed in this region especially that their ownership structures are centered on families and the state, and that Islam plays a major role in their governance. Our review establishes a solid foundation for future research directed at CG practices in the MENA region and encourages policymakers and practitioners to improve CG in the region.Theoretical/Academic Implications: To the best of our knowledge, this is the first systematic literature review covering CG in the MENA region. In an effort to encourage the continuing evolution of this research stream and augment its contributions to the broader CG literature, we develop an extensive research agenda focusing on several key topics that deserve further attention such as ownership and countries' political regimes, family business and royal families, Sharia law, and executive compensation, among others.Practitioner/Policy Implications: This review invites policymakers and investors to consider implementing better policies aimed at improving CG practices, specifically by fomenting transparency, developing financial markets, providing stronger protections for minority shareholders, and enhancing compliance with existing and new regulations.corporate governance, board of directors, financial disclosure, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), ownership 1 | INTRODUCTION Corporate governance (CG) research has exploded over the past few decades and adopted different perspectives from management, finance, and sociology, among other fields. Significant corporate scandals, public protests against excessive managerial greed (Dorff, 2014), the recklessness of some major financial institutions leading to the 2008 financial crisis (Aguilera et al., 2016), and heightened attention to sustainability (Jamali et al., 2008) have played a role in scholars' and practitioners' growing interest in CG. This governance

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PurposeThis conceptual paper uses the resource-based theory (RBT) of the firm to argue that for competitors to improve their innovation through a cooperative relationship – coopetitive relationship – they need to work on building a stable relationship with each other by investing a special type of resources, namely locked-in resources.Design/methodology/approachThe authors draw on RBT criteria to argue that when the antecedent – the locked-in resources – and the mediator – the relationship stability – are valuable, rare, inimitable and organized (VRIO), they will help the parties involved achieve sustained competitive advantage from the coopetitive relationship.FindingsThis paper argues that locked-in resources lead to higher coopetitive relationship stability by reducing the impact of opportunistic behavior from any of the partners. More stable relationship leads to more innovations especially radical innovations. In addition, the nature of the industry plays a moderating role. The industry's competitive intensity affects the relationship between locked-in resources and relationship stability. The industry's age affects the relationship between stability and innovation quantity and type.Research limitations/implicationsThis conceptual paper anchors its arguments within the RBT related to the firm's strategic resources (VRIO) characteristics and applies the same arguments (VRIO) beyond the firm level to the coopetitive relationship level. The model invites researchers and practitioners to consider two new constructs namely locked-in resources and coopetitive relationship stability in order to build successful coopetitive relationships.Practical implicationsThis paper contributes considerably and in a practical manner to managers as it draws their attention to the importance of investing a special type of resources, namely locked-in resources and ensuring the relationship stability with their coopetitors to achieve the desired outcome. It also draws the managers' attention to the impact industry's competitive intensity and industry's age have on the quality of the relationship and on the innovation outcomes.Originality/valueA distinct contribution of this conceptual paper is the introduction of two new constructs: locked-in resources and coopetitive relationship stability. Locked-in resources are valuable within the coopetitive relationship and they improve the second construct or relationship stability. Relationship stability is different from relationship strength as it leads to more trust between partners over longer periods of time.

Researchers found that powerful CEOs prevent their successors from reaching the top position. Yet to our knowledge, no published study examines how incoming CEOs deal with powerful outgoing CEOs. Using a qualitative approach, we find that, incoming CEOs experience different degrees of power struggles with powerful outgoing CEOs.