Apology diplomacy promises to assuage historical grievances held by foreign publics, yet in practice appears to ignite domestic backlash, raising questions about its efficacy. This article develops a theory of how political apologies affect public approval of an apologizing government across domestic and foreign contexts. The authors test its implications using large-scale survey experiments in Japan and the United States. In the surveys, the authors present vignettes about World War II grievances and randomize the nature of a government apology. They find that apology-making, both as statements acknowledging wrongdoing and as expressions of remorse, boosts approval in the recipient state. But in the apologizing state, backlash is likely among individuals with strong hierarchical group dispositions—manifested as nationalism, social-dominance orientation, and conservatism—and among those who do not consider the recipient a strategically important partner. This microlevel evidence reveals how leaders face a crucial trade-off between improving support abroad and risking backlash at home, with implications for the study of diplomatic communication and transitional justice.

Human rights prosecutions addressing wartime crimes are often credited with deterring future rights abuses, but routinely occur alongside state repression. This article develops a theory of how such prosecutions generate uneven effects across domestic human rights practice by making some repression tactics costlier than others—in the public visibility of the abuse or ease of attribution to leadership—or by directly substituting certain tactics. We test the implications with a multivariate probit analysis of novel prosecution data in contemporary conflict and post-conflict settings. Trials significantly reduce reliance on political imprisonment and extrajudicial killings, relatively visible abuses, whereas gains for less visible physical integrity rights are limited. Further, trials themselves are sometimes deployed as a direct substitute for political imprisonment. The findings reveal how human rights prosecutions themselves can be part of a government’s repressive toolkit, with implications for the study of transitional justice and the judicialization of repression.

How does transitional justice affect trust in government? Political trust is central to peaceful conflict resolution, but less is known about the ability of different transitional justice efforts to build confidence in government after war. Using survey-experimental evidence from post-conflict Guatemala, I compare how three commonly deployed justice policies (trials, truth commissions, and reparations) and political rhetoric accompanying them affect citizen attitudes toward government. Exposure to information about a trial or reparations program, which convey costly signals, led to significantly higher levels of political trust and perceived political legitimacy, when compared to the truth commission treatment. Further, a moral rhetoric emphasizing the normative claims of war victims was significantly more effective than either an instrumental rhetoric emphasizing institutional benefits or the absence of justification, regardless of policy content. The micro-level evidence reveals how the trust-building functions of transitional justice are far from uniform, speaking to the pivotal role of political communication.

How do domestic trials addressing wartime violence affect public opinion of government? The legitimation functions of national courts are well studied in liberal democracies, but less is known about the effects of trials that address abuses committed during large-scale conflict. This article investigates how the extent to which such trials achieve procedural justice (fairness in process) and retributive justice (allocation of punishment) affects perceptions of political legitimacy. I provide survey-experimental evidence from post-conflict El Salvador that leverages the repeal of a longstanding amnesty law. Although a trial in general improves citizen evaluations of state competence, fairness and punishment serve crucial – and distinct – legitimation functions. Procedural fairness significantly increased citizens’ willingness to comply with state authorities, regardless of trial outcome. Yet, an unfair trial, when coupled with punishment, bolstered trust in politicians and the judiciary. This suggests a trade-off between public preferences for fairness and an ‘iron fist’ approach to violence. The findings reveal the limits of procedural justice in a post-conflict environment and furnish new insights on the multifaceted functions of human rights trials.

How do human rights organizations (HROs) shape transitional justice policy in countries emerging from conflict? We investigate this question in the context of peace processes, a vital stage when many key post-conflict policies are determined. Using granular data on the content of peace agreements, we show that the robust presence of HROs significantly increases the likelihood of provisions promising criminal accountability for wartime abuses. Yet this association is conditional on prior ratification of international human rights instruments and the existence of impartial third parties in the peace process—background factors that lower barriers to effective HRO advocacy. These findings reveal a novel pathway through which HROs secure transitional justice on the national agenda after conflict.