Purpose -This paper aims to present a study on the organization of military logistics under "hot" conditions in an expeditionary crisis response operation. The authors' main research question is: in what way is armed forces logistics sourcing organized in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan? Design/methodology/approach -To answer their research question, the authors conducted a case study including field research at military sites in Afghanistan. The case study is focused on military organizations that operate in a hostile and ambiguous environment. The authors compare sourcing of three categories of support services, i.e. facilities management, maintenance & logistics and security. Findings -The authors' results include a systematic overview of the organization of command, logistic and accounting (sourcing) in the ISAF mission, involving multinational military partners and contractors. Second, the authors show how Canada, NATO, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the USA sourced the three categories of services mentioned in terms of sourcing profiles. Focusing on contracting, the authors outline which strategies NATO and the countries mentioned used in practice. And finally, differences and similarities are highlighted in the area of funding and accounting.Research limitations/implications -While the authors' study provides insight in the use of sourcing profiles identified in this paper, more research is necessary to identify criteria for explaining sourcing decisions of armed forces. Practical implications -The paper provides a systematic overview for practitioners and scholars and enhances manageability and policy development relevant for those who prepare, execute, monitor and evaluate missions. Originality/value -The authors' paper is one of the first to provide a systematic overview in operational defense sourcing relying on first-hand field data. This area of study is fragmented and remains mostly closed for non-military researchers.

In this paper we assess whether the balanced scorecard (BSC) supports the necessary functions for organizational viability. To this purpose, we use the viable system model (VSM) as a means to describe the functions required for organizational viability. Then we use the VSM as a template to assess whether and how the BSC supports these functions for organizational viability.

PurposeSets out to stress the need to adjust performance management to the deficiencies inherent in the output controls within The Netherlands defence forces.Design/methodology/approachBy analysing the management control reforms of the recent past, the paper assesses the scope for a “decision revelation” within the Defence organisation. It develops a framework for disclosure of decentralised decision making focusing on the allocation of labour time within the fixed labour force. Recent developments in the Defence organisation units for officer education and training are used to illustrate the framework.FindingsManagement control systems fail because of weaknesses in the management accounting information underlying them. Management accounting information with respect to defence expense budgets does not grasp the relevant decentralised decision making to be controlled. This decision making is primarily concerned with the opportunity costs of the allocation of time within the labour force of the Dutch Department of Defence.Practical implicationsVariability of costs should be disclosed in terms of labour time information. Budgetary accounting restricted to the department's (fixed) expenses on military personnel will not reveal for which purposes defence money is actually spent.Originality/valueOutlines a framework for decision revelation as a base for management contracting between central management and lower level organisation units.

The degree of collectiveness aimed for in European defence policy raises issues such as burden sharing and relative performance measurement of the European Armed Forces (EAF). This paper compares EAF performance rates on three dimensions: input, throughput and output. In order to express performance, over the period of 1995-2008, differing measures are formulated for each of these dimensions. It appears that, in ranking the burden-sharing behaviour, it is the selection of a specific measure that defines the position of each European country. The implication of our study is that in meaningfully ranking the performance of EAF in the context of burden sharing, various indicators should be combined.

This paper addresses the issue of measuring armed forces’ performance in crisis response operations. By means of interviews (17 respondents) and a large scale survey (1,253 respondents) field and general officers of the Netherlands Armed Forces (NAF) have been questioned on perceived organisational success in crisis response operations. The Dutch officers assess the NAF's performance positively. A number of senior officers are hesitant about the usefulness of measuring the performance of crisis response operations. According to them the context in which the operations are being executed is too complex. Most interviewees, however, are convinced that measuring performance is useful and should be improved. These military leaders express a strong need for criteria to assess their performance on the job.