No abstract

Public reporting for this collection of Information is estimated to average I hour per response, Including the time for reviewing Instructions, searching existing date sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of Information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215

Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of Information. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)Much of the recent national discussions about asymmetric warfare and asymmetric threats has been lacking a rigorous understanding of the dimensions of asymmetry in warfare. Because opponents in warfare are always looking for an asymmetric advantage against their adversary, the term "asymmetric warfare" fails to have a useful meaning. Warfare asymmetry discussions understandably address the War on Terror and U.S. homeland defense, with the focus on nonstate, nontraditional threats. From a national security perspective, however, it Is equally important to address asymmetric approaches plausibly employed by potential adversaries during conventional campaigns that will most likely be of a limited-objective nature. This report examines the nature of asymmetry in a conventional campaign from a maritime perspective and, in particular, that which might constitute an asymmetric threat from under the sea. Exploitation of the maritime undersea environment presents unique options for inferior force anti-access/area-denial capabilities, necessitating unique superior force access options. Military strategists and planners must further examine the risk that these asymmetries pose and must examine the use of U.S. asymmetric strengths. It Is expected that, when the maritime challenge of limited-objective conventional campaigns is examined from an asymmetric and inferior force perspective, U.S. strategy, tactics, applied technology, and military investments will need adjustment to reduce the uncertainty of the risk posed by asymmetric threats and to increase U.S. preparedness.

No abstract

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.