Local government restructuring should no longer be viewed as a simple dichotomy between private and public provision. A 1997 survey of chief elected township and county officials in New York shows that local governments use both private and public sector mechanisms to structure the market, create competition, and attain economies of scale. In addition to privatization and inter-municipal cooperation, two alternative forms of service delivery not previously researched-reverse privatization and governmental entrepreneurship-are analyzed here. Logistic regression on the 201 responding governments differentiates the decision to restructure from the level and complexity of restructuring. Results confirm that local governments are guided primarily by pragmatic concerns with information, monitoring, and service quality. Political factors are not significant in the restructuring process and unionization is only significant in cases of simple restructuring (privatization or cooperation used alone). Fiscal stress is not a primary motivator, but debt limits are associated with more complex forms of restructuring. Restructuring service delivery requires capacity to take risks and is more common among experienced local officials in larger, higher-income communities. Restructuring should be viewed as a complex, pragmatic process where governments combine public and private provision with an active role as service provider and market player. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

Introduction This is an exploratory study that compares how cities and towns provide services in the United States and Canada. It is an important issue because municipal services are essential to the vitality of our communities and the quality of life of their citizens. The security, health, and enrichment of our daily lives depend on the effective delivery of such services as: parks and recreation; museums, art galleries, and libraries; police, fire, and ambulance; health and human; and water and waste. A special focus in recent years has been on the extensive changes in method of service delivery and the consequent debate about the role of the private sector in this restructuring process. The study of the selection of the most efficient mode of service delivery is particularly instructive at the local level of government because it was at that level that changes occurred first and it is where researchers have focused the most attention. Public choice theorists assume that, by creating markets and giving consumers more choices, more efficient service delivery alternatives will be created (Savas, 2000). It is further assumed that market creation cannot be achieved without involving

The authors use a unique longitudinal data set from Ontario, covering the years 1984-92, to estimate the determinants of strike incidence and duration. Unlike most empirical analyses of strikes, the data set for this study contains both small and large bargaining units. The authors find strong evidence that the likelihood of a future strike was lower among bargaining units that had struck before than among those that had not (the "teetotaler" effect); the longer a strike lasted, the greater was the probability of settling (positive duration dependence); and smaller bargaining units were less likely to strike than were larger bargaining units, but had longer strikes when they did strike.During the past several decades, a large literature studying the incidence and duration of strikes has evolved. The bulk of this literature has been concerned with estimating and testing economic models of strikes. However, behavioral models of industrial conflict that incorporate sociological, psychological, and political considerations surrounding negotiations have also appeared (for example, Godard 1992). Estimation of these models requires information about the bargaining units that is not available in most micro data studies of strike incidence or duration. Most of the existing literature for Canada and the United States is primarily focused on the incidence and duration of strikes in large bargaining units-inthe United States, usually units with 1,000 or more workers; in Canada, usually units with 500 or more workers, but sometimes those with 200 or more workers. There is mounting evidence, however, that these large unit samples are unrepresentative of all strikes (Skeels, McGrath, and Arshanapalli 1988; Harrison and Stewart 1993). Not surprisingly, when small units are included in an empirical analysis, the estimates from strike incidence and duration models often show diverging patterns. For example, studies that include small strikes reveal some evidence of opposite incidence and duration effects for such factors as the business cycle and bargaining unit size (Gunderson and Melino 1990; Harrison and Stewart 1993).

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Unsatisfactory results from privatization have caused local governments to seek alternative reforms. Inter-municipal cooperation, mixed public/private delivery and contract reversals are three alternatives that have gained traction in the last decade.These alternatives help local governments manage markets for public service delivery as a dynamic process. They maximize government/market complementarities and address a wider array of public goals beyond cost efficiency concerns. The alternative reforms show how local governments balance citizen, labor and community interests to ensure efficiency, coordination and stability in public service delivery.