No abstract

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Revived Weimar-era "radical conservatism" and fresh "New Right" and "paleoconservative" theories offer a radical cultural critique of global capitalism and liberal democracy. Expressing a broader retribalization and perceived failure of modernization, their defense of communal particularity attacks the multicultural nation-state, liberal rights, and universal citizenship. This essay links reactionary tribalism to a recurrent 20th-century theoretical tendency, the "total critique of m odernity"-a fusion of ov ersimplified Nietzschean and Weberian ideas. Historically, total critique has promoted conver gence between right and left, such as the current overlapping facets of "radical conservatism" and "strong-program postmodernism." To tal critique counters the "historicist" method of "internal critique" and the "communication model" characteristic of reflexive social theory. The discussion uncovers the mediating role of social theory in the problematic relationship of science and partially disenchanted public spheres in plural, democratic cultures.

From the start, emancipatory theory has been plagued by contradictory and incompletely elaborated normative underpinnings that weaken its sociological and ethical credibility. Jiirgen Habermas, the leading contemporary critical theorist, has attempted to address this problem in an extensive reconstruction of the theories of Marx and Weber that appropriates elements of American pragmatist thought. Yet he resorts to an evolutionary normative argument that undermines the sociological powers of the two classical theories and contradicts the pragmatists' historical approach to values. This essay explains the significance of Habermasian theory for the emancipatory tradition, analyzes certain problems of the theory, and argues that an expanded dialogue with American pragmatism would strengthen both its sociological and its normative dimensions. Though the explicit focus is on the emancipatory tradition, the essay raises broader critical questions about pseudohistorical, normative justification in general sociological theory.The relation of fact to value has long been a central problem in the social sciences and a particularly controversial issue for partisan approaches that advocate sweeping social transformations. Since its inception during the Enlightenment, "critical" sociology has faced difficult questions about 1 I have benefited substantially from critical exchanges about this material with Douglas Kellner, Robert Kent, Harold L. Orbach, and Lawrence A. Scaff and from the incisive criticism of three anonymous AJS reviewers. Critical comments on earlier drafts by

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Sociological Review. American Sociological Review 1979, Vol. 44 (December):895-912One of the contributions of Max Weber is his distinction between formal and substantive rationality. When viewed in relation to his theory of bureaucracy this distinction provides a context for clarifying the domination aspects from the productive activities of organization. The case study of Roman bureaucracy is used to illustrate how the contradictions between two coexisting forms of rationality-one reflecting the control of persons and resources and the other the production (and distribution) of goods and services-contributed to the decline and collapse of the Roman Empire.Max Weber stressed the "specific and peculiar rationalism of western culture" (Weber, 1958:26). Furthermore, he was seriously concerned about its continuing intensification and diffusion through a related set of ever advancing developmental processes involving the disenchantment of nature, the scientization of thought, the deepening penetration of advanced technology into practical activities and the bureaucratization of social life. Weber's discussion of western rationalization' does not posit movement toward a Hegelian rational society where truth is actualized in social relations. Instead, Weber limits his emphasis to advances in the spheres of rational calculation and exact coordination of collective action. This refers to increased technical efficiency in controlling both the material and human environments. For Weber, these were by no means utopian developments because the consequent advances in production were accompanied by new forms of domination, alienation and waste.Weber (1968:85)2 distinguishes between * Direct all communications to: I am indebted to Michael Lacy for his careful reading and editorial, organizational and substantive criticism of several drafts of this paper. Also, David Willer has provided much insightful criticism and encouragement; he has significantly contributed to the work. Furthermore, thanks go to Scott McNall, George Ritzer, Alan Sica, Norm Yetman, and Augustus diZerega for useful comments and suggestions at various stages of the research. Finally, two anonymous A.S.R. reviewers provided solid criticism that contributed to the final draft. All these individuals have helped shape this essay, but I am alone responsible for any errors. This investigation was supported by University of Kansas research allocation #3485-xO-0038. I Rationalization must be understood in relation to Weber's broader concept of reason. The term is most often associated with social action and structures emph...