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Simple thought has been explained by the action-potential (AP) system with its synapses. In contrast, in-depth details for “Declarative” intellectual thought have been a complete mystery because (it is argued here) its main underlying mechanism is fundamentally different. Declarative thinking depends heavily on linear coding based on digit-like elements — something which an unaided AP system could never offer......Looking instead to psychology, Piaget (1920s) proposed basic units of action-sequences (“schèmes” whereby one could mentally construct object-concepts). There is now evidence that some ncRNA serves this verb-like action-coding role. — (Other ncRNA demonstrably serves as adjectival/adverbial “regulators” — while the remaining ≈3% of RNA encodes physical structures, the traditional noun-like role). If valid, then:–•NEW FOCUS ONTO ULTRAMICRO: — The whole Piagetian structure-coding for a concept could fit into one of the many 125nm capsids (“granules”). Moreover, many more concepts (and duplicates) could fit into a cell-body. — The vast abundance of coding-sites would allow comprehensive “wasteful” rapid use of Jerneian/Darwinian selection instead of problematic “writing down” of new learnings. — Estimates of memory-capacity increase vastly. — And hereditary-schèmes obviously explain inherited behaviour-traits. — Piaget’s other theory about develop¬mental stages also seems compatible.•Quantum-constraints ensure that such micro-sites would USE OPTICAL FREQUENCY signalling. That opens the way to greatly enhanced “Gigabit” rates, and optical-interference tricks.•MYELIN gets the EXTRA ROLE OF OPTIC-CABLE.So nerve-fibres become seen as simultan¬eous paths for two different types of signal (also demonstrated by Sun-et-al, 2010), with AP still dominant in some roles, but subservient to “UPE” optical signals elsewhere.•LOCATING MEMORIES? Choosing the right address means selecting some sort of “phone-number or numbered plug-socket.” That is best provided as an “address-label” sequence on the transmitted version of the schème-coding — in which case, actual destination-location may be less important.•“Moving-house” TO CORTICAL LONG-TERM MEMORY. The memory-move must preserve existing (i) memory-structure, and (ii) links to distant static archives. This “impossible” task would seem feasible if memories are actually held within individual cells (as above). There is indeed lifelong flow of such neurons in some mammals; but these flows seem to cease in adulthood for humans and dolphins! So the search continues.

Piaget's basic objective is seen as an attempt to explain how the individual and his evolutionary forbears can collectively gain practical mental‐models of the “real world”—starting ultimately from nothing, and without independent assistance. This paper firstly sets out to clarify Piaget's rather abstract views on this matter by postulating a more detailed mechanistic basis for them, and then interpreting various observations in terms of the hypothetical mechanisms. (This analytical approach is thus primarily intended as a heuristic aid; though it is also shown to be prima facie compatible with some other, non‐Piagetian paradigms.) It is concluded that a useful way of summarizing the process is in terms of the combined operations of preference for “internal closure” within the brain (Internal Coherence or consistency), and preference for “external closure” during interaction with the environment (Pragmatism or experimentation). In the light of this, Part II briefly discusses the views of Tarski, Popper and the Operationalists/Behaviourists concerning the nature of truth and the legitimacy of reductionism into unobservable domains.

This paper develops more specific details on how natural mental‐function might evolve within a wholly‐material brain system, depending entirely on “self‐organization” operating within á reasonably consistent environment. It is assumed that mental development can, in principle, be explained in detailed mechanistic terms. The attempt is then made to give the outlines of such an explanation, drawing on existing physiological knowledge, and considerations of the practical “design” difficulties which such a system would necessarily have to face. RNA‐like codeable strings are seen as the basic memory elements (rather than adaptable synapses). “Concepts” are explained as Piagetian mental models, built up in explained stages due to interaction with the real object, and encoded on the linear elements. Coordination between these elements is seen as biochemical but with the added available intermediary of electrically mediated signals, allowing coordination at a distance. The likelihood that subsequent developmental periods may recapitulate the same overall strategy is considered.