Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Mine-related transport infrastructure specializes in connecting mines to the coast, and not so much to neighboring countries. This is most clearly seen in developing countries, whose transport infrastructure was originally designed to facilitate the export of natural resources in colonial times. We provide first econometric evidence that mine-to-coast transport infrastructure matters for the pattern of trade of developing countries, and can help explaining their low level of regional integration. The main idea is that, to the extent that it can be used not just to export natural resources but also to trade other commodities, this infrastructure may bias a country's structure of transport costs in favor of overseas trade, and to the detriment of regional trade. We investigate this potential bias in the context of a gravity model of trade. Our main findings are that coastal countries with more mines import less than average from their neighbors, and this effect is stronger when the mines are located in such a way that the related infrastructure has a stronger potential to affect trade costs. Consistently with the idea that this effect is due to mine-to-coast infrastructure, landlocked countries with more mines import less than average from their non-transit neighbors, but more than average from their transit neighbors. Furthermore, this effect is specific to mines and not to oil and gas fields, arguably because pipelines cannot possibly be used to trade other commodities. We discuss the potential welfare implications of our results, and relate these to the debate on the economic legacy of colonialism for developing countries. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: F140, F540, Q320, R400.

Empirical studies have uncovered an inverted‐U relationship between product‐market competition and innovation. This is inconsistent with the original Schumpeterian model, where greater competition always reduces the profitability of innovation and thus the incentives to innovate. We show that the model can predict the inverted‐U if the innovators’ talent is heterogeneous and asymmetrically observable. When competition is low and profitability is high, talented innovators are credit‐constrained, since untalented innovators are eager to mimic them. As competition increases and profitability decreases, untalented innovators become less eager to mimic, and talented innovators can invest more. This generates the increasing part of the relationship. When competition is high and profitability is low, credit constraints disappear, and the relationship is decreasing. Our theory generates additional specific predictions that are well borne out by the existing evidence.

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Theories of war predict that the leader may launch a war on a follower who is catching up, since the follower cannot commit to not use their increased power in the future. But it was Japan who attacked the West in 1941: both leaders and followers start wars. Similarly, many have argued that trade makes war less likely, yet the First World War erupted at a time of unprecedented globalisation. We develop a model of trade and war that can explain both observations. Dependence on imports can lead followers to attack leaders or resource‐rich regions when they are subject to blockade.