The authors summarize the literature on competitive balance to point out that there is no need for Zimbalist's editorial position that a single measurement of competitive balance is the correct measure, whereas others are not. Different measurements are of different use, and all lines of research into competitive balance have, to date, proven quite instructive. To ignore this is to forgo important insights into the behavior of competitive balance.

Attendance, Outcome uncertainty, Break point analysis, L83, C22,

A recurrent finding in estimates of the gate demand for sports events is pricing in the inelastic portion of demand. With few exceptions, this finding has either been ignored or (rather poorly) explained away. In this paper, the recurrent outcome is detailed and the explanations given by past authors are discussed. Then, profit maximization theory is explored for its inelastic pricing implications. It ends up that the local TV revenue relationships between MLB teams satisfy the situation that theory predicts would generate inelastic gate pricing. This suggests two things. First, inelastic pricing is consistent with profit maximizing team behavior. Second, fuller specification of revenue functions will enhance future work in the area. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A growing literature on leagues composed of owners maximizing winning percentage shows that particular league rules have different impacts compared with leagues composed of profit-maximizing owners. But the underlying question of how to distinguish between the two types of leagues has received no treatment. In this article, we show that the two types of leagues can be distinguished in the talent market. A league of winningpercentage-maximizing owners will have higher talent costs and greater demand for talent. But, and perhaps more important, the level of competitive balance between the two types of leagues is indeterminate. In addition, a new policy instrument is suggested, namely, nudging owners toward one or the other objective, depending upon the particular locations of the demand for talent if owners pursue profits or winning percentage.

Past comparative work argues that the differences between European and North American sports dramatically outweigh any similarities. This paper explores the arguments that fans, sports organizations, and team objectives are different in the two regions and offers a set of questions that must be answered if, indeed, the opposite is not true. In addition, insights gained from the overriding similarities are offered concerning competitive balance, life after the Bosman decision, broadcasting, and league structure in Europe. European sports are far from any tragic end, but directors of sports organizations have seen the handwriting on the wall, economically speaking. They are about to live in lively times.