In the literature, one finds various explanations for the rise of financialized capitalism. In the different strands of financialization literature, housing either plays a minor role or is simply seen as one of the bearers of financialization. The relations between housing and financialization are under-researched and under-theorized. This article, first, looks at the rise of housing finance as an integral part of macro-economic policy, and second, at the role of financial globalization in the rise of housing finance. Housing is seen as an absorber of a ‘wall of money’, but the absorption of finance by housing is a very uneven process. Four trajectories of national institutional structures are suggested, and it is discussed how capital flows are absorbed in each of these trajectories. Finally, it is discussed what this tells about the geographies of financialized capitalism, and its relations to debt, housing, mortgage markets and the spatial fix.

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The paper focuses on transnational wealth elites buying residential properties in New York and London as an investment rather than as a primary residence. The transnational wealth elite is a group of people that have their origin in one locality, but invest their wealth transnationally since they entertain transnational jobs, assets and social networks. New York and London real estate has the unique quality that it is perceived to be highly liquid, i.e. easily resold to other investors. Together with the safe haven and socio-cultural characteristics of both cities and the way the real estate market and its professionals are organised, global city residential real estate functions as a ‘safe deposit box’. The paper brings together different geographies: of the wealth elite, of offshore financial centres through which most real estate purchases are organised, and of real estate investment locations. It also maps the consequences of the safe deposit box function of real estate, in terms of not only house prices increases, but also of economic, social and cultural changes and how elite decision-making impacted this comprehensive set of changes in the fabric of the city. In doing this, the paper substantiates work on the financialisation of real estate by focusing attention on the agency of the wealth elite and their investment and legal networks rather than on property developers, housing associations or institutional investors.

The securitization crisis that started in mid-2007 has demonstrated that we are indeed living in a "global financial village" and are all subject to the vagaries of financialization. Nevertheless, the fallout from the credit crisis has not been homogeneous across space. That some localities were hit harder than others suggests that there are distinct geographies of financialization. Combining insights from the "varieties of capitalism" literature with those from the literature on "financialization studies," the article offers a first take on what may explain these different geographies on the basis of an informal comparison of the trajectories of financialization and their political repercussions in the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands. The article ends with some reflections on how economic geography could be enriched by combining comparative studies on institutionalism and financialization, while its distinct research focus-detailed spatial analysis endowed with a well-developed sensitivity for geographic variegation-may help overcome the methodological nationalism of much comparative institutionalism. Copyright (c) 2010 Clark University.

Why does a social housing provider bet on interest rate fluctuations? This article presents a case study of the financialization of both housing and the state. Social housing in the Netherlands is provided by non-profit housing associations that have since 1989 been set apart from the state. Many associations started developing housing for profit, borrowing on global capital markets or buying derivatives. Whereas other semi-public institutions moved into the world of finance due to financial constraints, housing associations did so to capitalize on the possibilities offered by their asset-rich portfolios. Vestia, the largest of them all, is an extreme--but not exceptional--case of what can happen when public goals are left to be realized by inadequately supervised and poorly managed private organizations. As a result of gambling on derivatives, Vestia had to be bailed out to the tune of over 2 billion euros. To recoup the losses, housing was sold off and rents were raised. Almost half of Dutch housing associations used derivatives, although most refrained from using them purely speculatively. The changes in the housing sector that led to its financialization cannot be separated from the wider financialization of the state.