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This paper takes as its starting point Jung's definition of the self as the totality of the psyche. However, because the term psyche remains conceptually unclear the concept of the self as totality, origin and goal, even centre, remains vague. With reference to Heidegger's analysis of human being as Dasein, as well as Jung's writings, it is argued that Jung's concept of psyche is not a synonym for mind but is the world in which we live psychologically. An understanding of the psyche as existentially situated requires us to rethink some features of the self. For instance, the self as origin is thus not a pre-existential integrate of pure potentiality but the original gathering of existence in which, and out of which, personal identity is constituted. The ego emerges out of the self as the development and ownership of aspects of an existence that is already situated and gathered. Relations between the ego and the self are about what is known, or admitted, and its relation with what is already being lived within the gathering that is existence. The self as psyche, origin, and centre are discussed, as well as the meaning of interiority. Epistemological assumptions of object relations theory are critically discussed. The paper also includes critical discussions of recent papers on the self.

This summary is offered as a psychological definition of being-guilty. Guilt is lived pre-reflectively in a context of real or imaginary accusatory others, and is constituted as a person accepts responsibility for damaged world-relationships whose meanings constitute shared and personally appropriated values. The contradiction between valued and damaged world-relationships is lived existentially as a rupture between revealed and hidden modalities, in which an appearance of harmony and integrity is maintained by concealing both the hidden, damaged world-relationships to which the person feels guiltily indebted, and the fact of the existential rupture. Guilt's mood is constituted as feelings, not necessarily clearly articulate, of lack of self-acceptance. Guilt is resolved as, and to the extent that, the existential rupture is closed, and the person is able to be fully and unambiguously present in his openness to the world.

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In an attempt to fill the gap left by the widespread rejection of Freud's quasi-physiological metapsychology, the unconsciousness which Freud encountered is rearticulated in existential-phenomenological terms. It is argued that psychoanalysis and phenomenology converge in their attempt to understand the latent but operative meanings that structure human life. The unconscious is situated as an ambiguous, lived consciousness within the structure of perception, founded on the forgotten body's world-relations. Repression is discussed in terms of temporality and ambivalence. An incident in psychotherapy is presented in order to highlight these themes. Implications are drawn regarding the ambiguity of psychotherapy, transference, interpretation, and the language of psychology.