52% Yes, a signiicant crisis 3% No, there is no crisis 7% Don't know 38% Yes, a slight crisis 38% Yes, a slight crisis 1,576 RESEARCHERS SURVEYED M ore than 70% of researchers have tried and failed to reproduce another scientist's experiments, and more than half have failed to reproduce their own experiments. Those are some of the telling figures that emerged from Nature's survey of 1,576 researchers who took a brief online questionnaire on reproducibility in research. The data reveal sometimes-contradictory attitudes towards reproduc-ibility. Although 52% of those surveyed agree that there is a significant 'crisis' of reproducibility, less than 31% think that failure to reproduce published results means that the result is probably wrong, and most say that they still trust the published literature. Data on how much of the scientific literature is reproducible are rare and generally bleak. The best-known analyses, from psychology 1 and cancer biology 2 , found rates of around 40% and 10%, respectively. Our survey respondents were more optimistic: 73% said that they think that at least half of the papers in their field can be trusted, with physicists and chemists generally showing the most confidence. The results capture a confusing snapshot of attitudes around these issues, says Arturo Casadevall, a microbiologist at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in Baltimore, Maryland. "At the current time there is no consensus on what reproducibility is or should be. " But just recognizing that is a step forward, he says. "The next step may be identifying what is the problem and to get a consensus. "

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The present research examines how awareness of violence perpetrated against an out-group by one's in-group can intensify the infrahumanization of the out-group, as measured by a reduced tendency to accord uniquely human emotions to out-groups. Across 3 experiments that used different in-groups (humans, British, White Americans) and out-groups (aliens, Australian Aborigines, and Native Americans), when participants were made aware of the in-group's mass killing of the out-group, they infrahumanized the victims more. The perception of collective responsibility, not just the knowledge that the out-group members had died in great numbers, was shown to be necessary for this effect. Infrahumanization also occurred concurrently with increased collective guilt but was unrelated to it. It is proposed that infrahumanization may be a strategy for people to reestablish psychological equanimity when confronted with a self-threatening situation and that such a strategy may occur concomitantly with other strategies, such as providing reparations to the out-group.

What aspects of ingroup identification can lead people to resist justice for the victims of their ingroup's mistreatment? In three studies carried out in the US and UK, in which participants read reports of mistreatment of prisoners and civilians by coalition troops in the Iraq war, ingroup glorification, but not ingroup attachment or other individualdifference variables, was a key predictor of lesser demands for justice, but only when the perpetrators belonged to the ingroup. This effect of glorification was mediated by two moral disengagement mechanisms focusing on the outgroup: minimization of the emotional suffering of the victims' families, and explicit dehumanization of the victim group. These findings further reinforce the difference between glorification and other forms of ingroup identification, demonstrating that glorification is problematic in maintaining and fostering intergroup relations, because of its connection to moral disengagement.

Three experiments investigated the relationship between the presumption of harm in harmfree violations of creatural norms (taboos) and the moral emotions of anger and disgust. In Experiment 1, participants made a presumption of harm to others from taboo violations, even in conditions described as harmless and not involving other people; this presumption was predicted by anger and not disgust. Experiment 2 manipulated taboo violation and included a cognitive load task to clarify the post hoc nature of presumption of harm. Experiment 3 was similar but more accurately measured presumed harm. In Experiments 2 and 3, only without load was symbolic harm presumed, indicating its post hoc function to justify moral anger, which was not affected by load. In general, manipulations of harmfulness to others predicted moral anger better than moral disgust, whereas manipulations of taboo predicted disgust better. The presumption of harm was found on measures of symbolic rather than actual harm when a choice existed. These studies clarify understanding of the relationship between emotions and their justification when people consider victimless, offensive acts.