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In this article, I argue that the theory of fiction Henry Fielding developed in Joseph Andrews and Tom Jones is meant to address an understudied tension between empiricism and the pedagogic ambitions of the eighteenth-century novel. Empiricist philosophers such as John Locke and David Hume dismissed imaginative narratives as possible sources of socio-ethical knowledge, which they insisted should be drawn instead from direct experience or reliable factual reports. I argue that Fielding’s moral epistemology was more fundamentally empirical than scholars usually recognize, and that an important function of his theoretical chapters in Joseph Andrews and Tom Jones is to show that prose fiction can be sufficiently grounded in the data of experience to meet the epistemic standards of empiricism. Fielding pursues this goal by developing two theses: first, that his characters and events are embodiments of principles derived inductively from observation and experience, and, second, that the conformity between the copies and the originals can be empirically measured by the reader’s subjective sense of probability.

Challenging the common image of Hume as a thoroughly secular philosopher, I argue that Hume occasionally relied on the design argument to defend the objectivity of values. Hume acknowledged that rejecting design might open the door to aesthetic, ethical, and epistemic relativism. To avoid this prospect, he allowed himself to repurpose the language of providential naturalists like Hutcheson and claim that “nature,” rather than God, has attuned our faculties to objective standards of morals, beauty, and truth. Historians of philosophy have treated such passages as merely figurative, as they conflict with fundamental principles in Hume's philosophy. I argue instead, from an intellectual historical perspective, that Hume nonetheless expects the passages to be read literally, since only the literal reading helps his case against relativism. Rather than recasting Hume as a defender of design, however, I argue that his appeals to design were less an integral part of his philosophy than a provisional compromise, a response to intractable tensions in the history of secularism.

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