We analyse distributional effects of four car-related tax instruments: an increase of the fuel tax, a new kilometre tax, an increased CO2-differentiated vehicle ownership tax, and a CO2-differentiated purchase tax on new cars. Distributional effects are analysed with respect to income, lifecycle category and several spatial dimensions. All the analysed taxes are progressive over most of the income distribution, but just barely regressive if the absolutely highest and lowest incomes are included. However, the variation within income groups is substantial; the fraction of the population who suffer substantial welfare losses relative to income is much higher in lower income groups. The two most important geographical distinctions are between rural and urban areas (including even small towns), and between central cities and satellites/suburbs; these spatial dimensions matter much more for distributional effects than for example whether an area is remote or sparsely populated.

No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

The two Nordic countries Norway and Sweden have launched governance regimes for the early phases of transport infrastructure investments after experiencing frequent cost overruns and low cost-benefit ratios. This study seeks to find out if these governance regimes have reduced the escalation of costs from early estimates to finalized projects and influenced the choice of projects away from those with lower benefit to cost ratios. We have compared governance regimes for major transport infrastructure investments in the two countries and examined the development and content of quality assurance activities, the involvement of internal and external parties, their duties and responsibilities, their stage gate models, and how decisions are made. The findings are that both countries have introduced formalizations of their governance regimes that mandate project reviews during the planning process and quality assurance, both of which have increased early cost estimates. One difference was that in Norway, the Ministry of Finance manages the quality assurance scheme and imposes external quality assurance requirements, while Sweden has no corresponding ministerial oversight. Therefore, on the one hand, the process is more strictly formalized in Norway, but on the other hand, cost-benefit ratios appear to have more weight in Sweden. Furthermore, although both countries have done several ex post evaluations, neither country has introduced a formalized ex post evaluation process allowing for systematic examination of the causes of cost overruns and low benefit to cost ratios. Even so, politicians may manoeuvre projects with lower benefit to cost ratios around the governance systems in both countries. Finally, some projects in both countries still have experienced significant cost escalations despite these processes.