The extent to which directors of target companies act in their own interests, and not shareholder interests, when a takeover bid is received is examined using data from 400 takeover bids for Australian listed companies. A series of hypotheses is developed from theoretical inquiry into the motives of target company directors. Using univariate and multivariate analysis to test these hypotheses, it is found that directors' accept/reject recommendations to shareholders are associated with target leverage, bid premium, bidder's initial shareholding, ownership concentration (univariate only) and directors' share holding in the target (univariate only). It is concluded that, overall, directors have acted in a manner consistent with shareholder interests, even though personal wealth effects are greatest for directors of bid-accept targets.

This paper extends the time frame of the traditional event-study methodology to provide a more precise measure of the wealth effects from corporate takeovers. The extended methodology is applied empirically to examine the observed abnormal returns surrounding corporate takeovers in Australia using daily price data. The wealth effects from takeovers involving corporate raiders as acquirors are also examined and compared to those involving non-raiding acquirors. It is found that takeovers initiated by both raiding and non-raiding firms result in significant positive abnormal returns, although acquiring raiders appear to capture more of those abnormal returns than do their non-raiding counterparts.

This paper reports the results of an investigation into takeover defence strategies used by Australian listed companies since the inception of the Takeover Code in 1981. The results are compared to Trotman's (1981) analysis of defence strategies used while the Companies Act, 1961 was in force. Conclusions are drawn about the effects the Takeover Code and its administration have had on tactics employed by directors to defend a takeover bid.