Abstract:The implementation of the Basle II agreement in the financial markets of world economies has been seen as a significant advance in relation to the model enforced under the first agreement (Basle I). It is generally understood that the new agreement represents a substantial advance in relation to the first because it allows banks to better deal with the risks to which they are exposed. Nevertheless, when the application of these principles to development banks is considered it can be noted that certain inconsistencies exist, notably the fact that these institutions are typically public institutions -or at least strongly dependent on public fundingand they do not operate the payment system of the economy. Therefore, the application of the Basle rules to these institutions does not make sense. This means that Basle does not represent an appropriate set of recommendations for how these institutions should deal with their risks, whether because the proposed form of dealing with risks is inadequate, or because other relevant risks for these institutions are not covered by Basle I and II.Key words: development banks, Basle II, risk Resumo A implementação do Acordo de Basiléia II nos mercados financeiros das economias mundiais é visto como um avanço significativo em relação ao modelo implementado no primeiro acordo (Basiléia I). É comumente entendido que o novo acordo representa um avanço substancial em relação ao primeiro porque ele permite aos bancos lidar melhor com os riscos aos quais eles estão expostos. No entanto, quando se considera a aplicação desses princípios para bancos de desenvolvimento nota-se que certas incosistências existem, notadamente o fato de que essas instituições são tipicamente instituições públicas -ou pelo menos fortemente dependentes de recursos públicos -e que não operam o sistema de pagamentos da economia. Portanto, a aplicação das regras de Basiléia para essas instituições não faz sentido. Isto significa que Basiléia não representa um conjunto apropriado de recomendações a respeito de como essas instituições deveriam lidar com seus riscos, seja porque a forma proposta de lidar com os riscos é inadequada, seja porque outros riscos relevantes para essas instituições não são cobertos por Basiléia I ou II.Palavras-chave: bancos de desenvolvimento, Basilëia II, risco.

Desde 1998, o financiamento da educação pública fundamental no Brasil está submetido a critérios de vinculação de receitas governamentais regulamentados pelo Fundef (Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e de Valorização do Magistério). Entre os objetivos do fundo está o de garantir recursos mínimos para o investimento público em educação fundamental, assegurando a qualidade do ensino oferecido e, por conseguinte, a melhora na proficiência dos alunos. Com base nos dados de volume de recursos investidos no ensino fundamental via Fundef e nos resultados das Saebs (sinopses estatísticas da educação básica), este artigo analisa os efeitos dessa política pública sobre o desempenho dos alunos da rede pública de ensino fundamental brasileira. Os resultados apontam a importância do aporte financeiro e da qualificação do magistério para o aperfeiçoamento da qualidade da educação pública.

The Brazilian economy was severely hit by the 2008 crisis. In the beginning of the crisis, the vast majorities of the economic agents and authorities thought that Brazil could face some sort of decoupling since some macroeconomic fundamentals were very good. What we saw, however, was that the Brazilian economy was not decoupled, and expectations faced a huge deterioration soon after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 15th. Two aspects regarding the impact of crisis in Brazil, however, deserve a great deal of attention: (a) although deep, the impact did not last for a long time. Actually, the GDP growth experienced a good recovery in the second quarter of 2009, showing that the health of the Brazilian economy was good; (b) the Brazilian banking system performed very well during the crisis, although we cannot say the system was not in danger in the worst time of the crisis. In spite of the confidence crisis faced by the banking system, it showed a great deal of resilience. In this aspect, we argue that the restructure faced by the banking system in the aftermath of the Real Plan, as well as the development of a solid supervision regulation helped a lot the system to avoid the systemic crisis that was an open possibility to the Brazilian banking system in the end of 2008. These notes, thus, discusse why the Brazilian banking system performed pretty well in the 2008 financial crisis and how the Brazilian banking (and prudential) regulation can be taken as responsible for this good performance. More specifically, the paper back to the middle of the 1990s, when the Real Plan was implemented, in order to understand the role played by the restructuring of the Brazilian financial system in helping to pave the way to the great resilience experienced by the Brazilian banking system during the 2008 crisis. More specifically, the prudential regulation that was

No abstract

According to the interview of the then Director of Monetary Policy of the Central Bank of Brazil Mario Toros to the newspaper Valor Econômico (Valor, 2009), the Brazilian banking system experienced a confidence crisis soon after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers that led to an intervention of the Brazilian Central Bank to avoid a systemic crisis.