This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

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This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR3049Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.R® is a registered trademark.Cover: USNS Mendonca offloads cargo in Virginia Beach, Va. (U.S. Navy photo).iii PrefaceTo fight in remote areas, the U.S. military must be able to move large amounts of cargo as required by the operational plans of combatant commanders. Strategic sealift-a fleet of 61 commercial-standard ships-plays a central role in meeting these transportation requirements. Given the importance of the strategic sealift fleet, the U.S. Navy is interested in ensuring that these ships are ready to respond when the need arises. The fleet is managed by two organizations, the Military Sealift Command, the naval component of the U.S. Transportation Command, and the Maritime Administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation. The Navy wanted a better understanding of how the different management models used by these organizations affected the readiness of the fleet. But the research quickly pointed to the fact that other factors-including how requirements are determined, material readiness, and personnel readiness-affected strategic sealift readiness as much as or more than organizational management. As a result, this report touches on all these topics as they collectively pertain to readiness of the strategic sealift fleet and offers recommendations on how readiness can be improved.The findings and conclusions presented in this report will be of interest both to U.S. Transportation Command as it determines readiness for meeting operational requirements and to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in determining resource and investment priorities to meet these requirements.

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