Industry-university collaborations (IUCs) have received increased attention in management practice and research. The need for innovation in today's business environment and the ambition of policymakers to commercialize academic knowledge intensify this trend. However, although research has devoted considerable effort to finding the determinants of success for interfirm collaboration, much less is known about IUCs. This article presents the results of a systematic review of the literature on the collaboration between industry and universities. We perform an extensive analysis of research published on industry-university collaboration projects with the objective of distilling factors that influence the success of such collaborations. We propose a novel conceptual model, which synthesizes our empirical results, and use it to organize and categorize influencing factors and their interrelationship within the collaboration process. Based on our review of existing literature, we identify an agenda for future research in this domain.

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Accounting standards, Regulation, Political lobbying, Veto players, M48, K20,

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In this study, we apply a new concept, corporate proximity to political power, to accounting research and examine its consequences on corporate financial reporting. Prior literature shows that higher proximity to political power leads to higher policy risk, i.e., uncertainty regarding the impact of future administration policies on the cash flow of the firm. An increase in policy risk implies an increase in the opaqueness of the information environment and in the expected volatility of future operating profitability; we argue that these effects both encourage and facilitate earnings management. Drawing on recent research in finance and political science, we use a measure of the alignment along party lines between politicians elected at the state level and the federally elected President as our main measure of proximity to political power. We find a significant positive association between the political alignment of firms' home states and their level of absolute discretionary accruals. Consistent with the idea that firms engage in corporate political activities (lobbying and financial contributions) to hedge against policy risk, our results only hold for firms not engaging in such activities.