No abstract

No abstract

This research memorandum provides estimates of the costs of the tanker portion of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) from 1987 to 1995. These estimates show what it would cost if the Navy chose to fill the entire shortfall of U.S.-owned militarily useful tankers by building up the RRF. The study does not recommend this course of action, but merely establishes what the Navy's dollar costs are likely to be in the years ahead. An important finding is that the annual costs of an RRF of that size would substantially exceed budgeted funds as reflected in the latest Five-Year Defense Plan. Without additional funding of about $200 million or more per year over the next nine years, the tanker RRF probably would not be able to accomplish the Navy's fuel-delivery mission. Even with such an infusion of funds the RRF may not be workable, because adequate supplies of U.S. merchant sailors and U.S. shipyards may not be available.

No abstract

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. ABSTRACTOperation Desert Shield has put U.S. transportation capabilities to the test; the lessons learned provide a starting point for gauging their appropriateness for the post-cold-war period. This research memorandum is a first assessment of the case of sealift. It describes sealift resources available to the U.S., summarizes their performance during the first five months of Desert Shield, and examines several options for improving U.S. sealift potential in the 1990s.