Abstract. In this paper, the dynamics of a Bertrand duopoly game with technology innovation have been studied, which contains boundedly rational and naive players. They have been analyzed that the stability of the equilibrium point, the bifurcation and chaotic behavior of the dynamic system. It has been proved that technology innovation has played a very important role in the stability of Nash equilibrium point. Technology innovation can enlarge the stability region of the speed and control the chaos of the dynamic system effectively.
Many factors affect the diffusion of generic technology due to the variety of generic technology and the multiplicity of diffusion carriers. Therefore, it is very urgent to determine the main factors that influence generic technology diffusion. Based on theories of industrial generic technology diffusion, this paper constructs a differential game-based model between government and enterprises. Then, this study explores the key factors that affect the diffusion strategy of industrial generic technology innovation and analyzes the possible method for improving industrial generic technology innovation diffusion. The following conclusions are obtained. Incentive measures, rewards, and penalties play a key role in the diffusion of generic technology, and the costs and benefits incurred by the diffusion are critical to the diffusion of generic technology. Also, the net income of enterprises has a positive impact on the adoption of generic technology diffusion. After that, this paper carries out data simulation for result verification and provides some policy implications.
During major epidemics, monitoring vaccine quality can ensure the public health and social stability. Considering that social media has become an important way for the public to obtain external information during the epidemic. We developed a dual regulatory system of vaccine quality with the government in the leading role and the participation of We Media, and constructed a four-party evolutionary game model (government regulatory agency, We Media, vaccine industry groups, and the public) and analyzed the stability of each game player’s strategy choice. The system’s possible equilibrium points are identified using Lyapunov’s first law. Then the game trajectory between stakeholders is simulated by MATLAB, the effects of initial intention and parameters on the evolution process and results are analyzed. The results show that to ensure the quality and safety of vaccines and stabilize network public opinion during epidemics, the government should invest in an effective supervision mechanism. By strengthening responsibility, increasing penalties, and reducing supervision costs, the probability of vaccine industry groups providing high-quality vaccines is effectively enhanced. Restricting the behavior of We Media and supervising vaccine industry groups to reduce speculation reduces the cost of government supervision and improves its efficiency.
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