This article gives a concise overview of the theoretical development of the concept of the "second demographic transition" since it was coined in 1986, its components, and its applicability, first to European populations and subsequently also to non-European societies as well. Both the demographic and the societal contrasts between the first demographic transition (FDT) and the second demographic transition (SDT) are highlighted. Then, the major criticisms of the SDT theory are outlined, and these issues are discussed in the light of the most recent developments in Europe, the United States, the Far East, and Latin America. It turns out that three major SDT patterns have developed and that these evolutions are contingent on much older systems of kinship and family organization.second demographic transition | subreplacement fertility | cohabitation | household structure | values T he first or "classic" demographic transition refers to the historical declines in mortality and fertility, as witnessed from the 18th century onward in several European populations and continuing at present in most developing countries. The end point of the first demographic transition (FDT) was supposed to be an older stationary population corresponding with replacement fertility (i.e., just over two children on average), zero population growth, and life expectancies higher than 70 y. Because there would be an ultimate balance between deaths and births, there would be no "demographic" need for sustained immigration. Moreover, households in all parts of the world would converge toward the nuclear and conjugal type, composed of married couples and their offspring. Such were the expectations in the early 1970s. Thereafter, as the baby boom of the 1960s was followed by the baby bust of the 1970s, these expectations were altered to accommodate the possibility of oscillating fertility as a function of labor-market conditions.The second demographic transition (SDT) viewpoint, jointly formulated by Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa in 1986 (1, 2), in contrast, sees no such equilibrium as the end point. Rather, they argue that new developments from the 1970s onward can be expected to bring about sustained subreplacement fertility, a multitude of living arrangements other than marriage, a disconnection between marriage and procreation, and no stationary population (3, 4). Furthermore, populations will face declining sizes if not complemented by new migrants (i.e., "replacement migration"), and they will also be much older than envisaged by the FDT as a result of lower fertility and considerable additional gains in longevity. Migration streams will not be capable of stemming aging altogether, however, because migrants also age and lower their own fertility with time spent in receiving nations.In the long run, mass immigration might stabilize population sizes; but this outcome would still involve the further growth of "multicultural societies." On the whole, the SDT brings a variety of new social challenges, including those associated with further aging, ...