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A modelling framework incorporating relationships between agricultural production and groundwater hydrology was developed to estimate the bene¢ts of improved irrigation e¤ciency in the Riverland of South Australia. Increased irrigation e¤ciency can generate external bene¢ts to downstream users through reduced discharge of saline groundwater. In the Riverland these bene¢ts are large in comparison to the direct value of the irrigation water. However, the nonexclusive and site-speci¢c nature of these bene¢ts makes it di¤cult to fully internalise them through market instruments such as salinity credits. Achieving optimal irrigation e¤ciency is likely to require institutional arrangements that promote collective investment and public expenditure.

BackgroundClimate change is a global public health problem that will require complex thinking if meaningful and effective solutions are to be achieved. In this conceptual paper we argue that GPs have much to bring to the issue of climate change from their wide-ranging clinical experience and from the principles underpinning their clinical methods. This experience and thinking calls forth particular contributions GPs can and should make to debate and action.DiscussionWe contend that the privileged experience and GP way of thinking can make valuable contributions when applied to climate change solutions. These include a lifetime of experience, reflection and epistemological application to first doing no harm, managing uncertainty, the ability to make necessary decisions while possessing incomplete information, an appreciation of complex adaptive systems, maintenance of homeostasis, vigilance for unintended consequences, and an appreciation of the importance of transdisciplinarity and interprofessionalism.SummaryGeneral practitioners have a long history of public health advocacy and in the case of climate change may bring a way of approaching complex human problems that could be applied to the dilemmas of climate change.

Context Public health surveillance includes dissemination of data and information to those who need it to take action to prevent or control disease. The concept of data to action is explicit in the mission of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) National Environmental Public Health Tracking Program (Tracking Program). CDC has built a National Environmental Public Health Tracking Network (Tracking Network) to integrate health and environmental data to drive public health action (PHA) to improve communities’ health. Objective To assess the utility of the Tracking Program and its Network in environmental public health practice and policy-making. Design We analyzed information on how Tracking has been used to drive PHAs within funded states and cities (grantees). Two case studies illustrate such use. Setting Analyses included all grantees funded between 2005 and 2013. Participants The number of grantees varied from 17 for 2006–2008 to 24 for 2010–2013. Main Outcome Measures We categorized each PHA reported to determine how grantees became involved, their role, the problems addressed, and the overall action. Results Tracking grantees reported 178 PHAs from 2006–2013. The most common overall action was “provided information in response to concern” (n=42) followed by “improved a public health program, intervention, or response plan” (n=35). Tracking’s role was most often to enhance surveillance (24%) or to analyze data (23%). In 47% of PHAs, the underlying problem was a concern about possible elevated rates of a health outcome, a potential exposure, or a potential association between a hazard and health. PHAs were started by a request for assistance (48%), in response to an emergency (8%), and though routine work by Tracking programs (43%). Conclusion Our review shows that the data, expertise, technical infrastructure, and other resources of the Tracking Program and its Network are driving state and local PHAs.

While there is potential for substantial benefits from water entitlement trade, external effects such as salinity may mean that traders cannot capture these benefits. This paper demonstrates that by creating a trading house as a single seller of water entitlements, with trade profits distributed to buyers, it is possible to achieve an allocation of entitlements which gives a social outcome higher than that possible from atomistic competition for entitlements. Such an outcome may be comparable to an optimally set uniform charge for water entitlements, but the trading house mechanism has the advantage that it makes use of trade to generate information on the optimal level of charging in the presence of salinity.