Homeownership presents an opportunity to accumulate wealth, making it an appealing vehicle for reducing wealth inequality. In this Commentary, we explore the investment side of homeownership. The opportunity for leveraged returns can lead to wealth gains among lower-income households; however, we note that homeownership for low-income homeowners carries three types of risk that are higher for them than for high-income homeowners: location, timing, and liquidity. Thus, policies that incentivize purchasing homes to reduce wealth inequality or close racial wealth gaps should be adopted only after great care has been taken to protect against these risks.

We measure wealth mobility in the United States. Using the latest wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), we update Carroll and Hoffman (2017), who document a decreasing trend in wealth mobility over the past 30 years. We confirm another of their findings that large upward movements in wealth are associated with families’ owning businesses and real estate other than a primary residence. Finally, we turn to the much larger Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data and document that these “large mover” households are evident even over three-year periods.

Mean (or headline) PCE inflation has typically fallen below median PCE inflation, and since 2012 the difference has been large. To understand the reasons for this trend, we investigate which components of the headline measure are contributing to the difference. We find that energy components, which frequently undergo wide price swings, and electronics, which have been steadily decreasing in price for decades, explain most of the difference between the two inflation measures. We argue that the outsized impacts of such components on headline PCE inflation reinforce the need for policymakers

Many observers seeking historical precedent for COVID-19 draw on the 1918 influenza pandemic. In this Commentary, we highlight the differences between the 1918 flu and COVID-19 pandemics in terms of the most significantly affected populations. We also show key differences in the US economy in the late 1910s and now. Not only did the 1918 influenza virus primarily affect significantly younger cohorts, but the US economy’s industry and geographic distributions were notably different at the time compared to today’s. Consequently, caution is needed when using the 1918 influenza pandemic as a guideline for implementing and evaluating policy responses to COVID-19.