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This article presents an account of collective memory which explains its relationship to individual memory on the one hand and to history on the other. It argues that the role of memory, both individual and collective, is not merely cognitive; it is also normative. That is, memory does not simply transmit information from the past to the present; it also transmits responsibilities. Insofar as collective memory has a cognitive aspect, it makes claims about the past. These may be confirmed or disconfirmed by historical research. This does not mean that collective memory is just bad history. It is more like history written in the first person, and its role is to inform the present generation of its responsibilities to the past.

My main concern in this paper will be with questions of national identity, multiculturalism, and aboriginal rights as they have emerged in Australia, especially over the past twenty or so years. The issues are not, of course, unique to Australia: similar questions have arisen in other places, including Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. However, each place has specific problems, and while I hope that much of what I say has relevance to these countries, I will not try to establish this here.The paper falls into two parts. In the first, I argue for certain limits on the practice of multiculturalism. The basis of this argument is a concern for national identity – especially for what I will call ‘national sovereignty.’ This is a familiar conservative position; however, I hope to show that it is one which liberals and those on the left should take seriously. In the second part of the paper, I distinguish the issue of Aboriginal (or indigenous) rights from multiculturalism, and try to establish that the basis of these rights is a principle very similar to the notion of national sovereignty.

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