Patients suffering from viral haemorrhagic fevers must be handled specifically. The clinical diagnosis of these diseases in the initial stage is difficult because early symptoms are non specific. In Germany, specific diagnosis is available at two diagnostic centres with biosafety level 4 facilities. Five high security infectious disease isolation units for patient care are available in Munich, Leipzig, Hamburg, Berlin, and Frankfurt. In addition, a corresponding number of centres of competence are established to offer support and advice to the hospitals initially treating the patients and to the local public health officers. The decentralisation of these centres of competence is recommended to allow for more timely and reactive responses to VHF epidemic threats.The risk categorisation for contacts has proved to be very useful in practice.

Necessary anti-epidemic measures have to be promulgated or taken immediately in case of a suspected case of pneumonic plague or a viral haemorrhagic fever which can be transmitted from human to human. A live threatening highly contagious infectious disease may occur at any place in Germany. Therefore each health office should have the relevant information on the available infrastructure in Germany concerning treatment and competence centres, diagnostic laboratories, dispatch of samples and patient transportation. They should also be able to give qualified recommendations to physicians and hospitals concerning the necessary measures in such a case. Contacts at risk have to be notified. Based on a risk assessment and the special living conditions of the contact person they should decide if and which further measures have to be initiated, especially in the case of post-exposure prophylaxis, separation and prohibition of work. In general, imported cases of dangerous infectious diseases quickly find the interest of the media, including all the implications resulting from this. A well-organized cooperation with the media and public relations helps to avoid unnecessary irritations and panic.

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The following conceptual framework formed the basis for a common decision made by the health ministers of Germany's 16 federal states to set up an influenza pandemic preparedness plan. The worst case scenario was used, on the basis of the data from the pandemic of 'Spanish flu', in 1918-20. The priority groups for vaccination were assessed, as well as the potentially available antiviral treatments. National policies could be highly improved by a common European view.

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