No abstract

Excessive dispersion of development assistance has been high on the Paris Agenda on aid effectiveness. However, there is no agreement in the existing literature on how aid dispersion should be measured and few studies of the extent of the problem. We argue for using the Theil Index for both recipients and donors. This relative inequality measure has a major advantage: it allows for a perfect decomposition into variation between and within entities. Exploiting this property, we can rank official donors and recipients not only in terms of the total spread, but also assess the contributions of geographic and sectoral dispersion. We provide a detailed picture of developments along various dimensions (globally as well as for countries, income groups, and regions, over 1998-2013). We further distinguish between bilateral and multilateral donors. Consistent with other studies using more limited samples, we find little effect of the Paris Agenda overall. Aid is more fragmented in Sub-Saharan Africa and in the poorest countries. Globally as well as for most donor and recipient countries, between variation is the main driver of the spread, lending support to the geographic concentration policies many donor countries have adopted. Bilateral aid has been somewhat more dispersed than multilateral aid and in both cases the large number of donors controlling similar shares of total funds is a major driver of the total spread. The latter suggests that concentration could also be achieved through a reduction of the number of actors on the donor side of the aid industry, a perspective that previous studies using other measures have been unable to capture.

Current aid rhetoric emphasizes the selective allocation of otherwise unconditional funds in support of the recipients' own plans, in contrast to the old donor practice of bundling money and policies. I show that when recipients have private information, policies reflecting their preferences and knowledge might result in such a regime. However, generous transfers can also induce them to conform to the outcome-oriented expectations of donors at the expense of lower aid impact. Such behaviour is consistent with an abundance of case-study evidence. Moderate disagreements over what the optimal policy is could actually produce better results. Certain forms of both donor competition and coordination might also eliminate this distortion, while a donor concern for need only removes incentives for aid-seeking in the least needy countries. In summary, optimal aid policies are highly context-specific, and donors should thus concentrate their efforts to practise more informed selectivity.

I study equilibria of non-cooperative games between an aid donor and a recipient when there is conflict over the allocation of their combined budgets. The general conclusion is that a donor's influence over outcomes is increasing in the share of the available resources it controls; if this share is large enough, aid is not fungible. The game-theoretic approach to fungibility is contrasted with the traditional non-strategic approach. I argue that the former is superior as it derives final allocations instead of assuming them, making analysis of the sources of influence over outcomes possible.

Many verifiable contracts are impossible or difficult to enforce. This applies to contracts among family and friends, contracts regulating market transactions, and sovereign debt contracts. Do such nonenforceable contracts matter? We use a version of the trust game with participants from Norway and Tanzania to study repayment decisions in the presence of non-enforceable loan contracts. Our main finding is that the specific content of the contract has no effect on loan repayment. Rather, the borrowers seem to be motivated by other moral motives, which contributes to explaining why they partly fulfill non-enforceable contracts. We also show that some borrowers violate the axiom of first-order stochastic dominance when rejecting loan offers. This seems partly to be due to negative reciprocity, but may also reflect that there are individuals who have a preference for not accepting something referred to as a "loan." JEL Codes: C91, D03