No abstract

Berry et al.'s (1998) measures of U.S. state citizen and government ideology rely on unadjusted interest-group ratings for a state's members of Congress to infer information about (1) the ideological orientation of the electorates that selected them or (2) state legislators and the governor from the same state. Potential weaknesses in unadjusted interest-group ratings prompt the question: Are the Berry et al. measures flawed, and if so, can they be fixed by substituting alternative measures of a member's ideology? We conclude that a version of the Berry et al. state government ideology indicator relying on NOMINATE common space scores is marginally superior to the extant version. In contrast, we reaffirm the validity of the original state citizen ideology indicator and find that versions based on NOMINATE common space scores and adjusted ADA and COPE scores introduced by Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) are weaker. berry et al. (hereafter "BRFH") (1998) offer two measures of ideology in the American states, observed annually for years after 1959. 1 Their indicator of citizen ideology measures the average location of the active electorate in each state on a liberal-conservative continuum. Their government ideology indicator measures the average location of the elected officials in each state on the same continuum. The underlying continuum for both indicators is conceived as operational ideology (or policy mood)-the kinds of policies preferred-rather than self-identification (or symbolic ideology) Stimson 1991). These ideology indicators have proven useful in analyzing the impact of public opinion or the policy preferences of elected officials on a wide variety of state policy outputs, including welfare reform at UNIV OF GEORGIA LIBRARIES on June 9, 2015 spa.sagepub.com Downloaded from

Does state political ideology change over time? Brace et al. (2004, 537) say no, based on their analysis of three longitudinal measures of state citizen ideology: Berry et al.‘s (1998) indicator that relies on election results and congressional roll call votes, and two indicators that Brace et al. construct from ideological self-placement items, one using GSS and ANES survey results, and the other employing surveys conducted by CBS/New York Times. The authors imply that the ideological stability they detect precludes the possibility that state citizen ideology influences state policy. However, this implication stems from Brace et al.‘s definition of meaningful ideological change as differences in the relative ideology of states over time rather than absolute changes in ideology within states. We contend that this argument is both logically and methodologically flawed. Brace et al. maintain that their CBS/New York Times and GSS/ANES indicators are valid measures of state citizen ideology, but that the Berry et al. indicator is not. To assess this claim, it is crucial to distinguish between ideological self-identification (or symbolic ideology) and policy mood (or operational ideology). We find that the Berry et al. measure is a valid indicator of policy mood, but that it is invalid as a measure of self-identification. In contrast, the CBS/New York Times and GSS/ANES measures are invalid as indicators of policy mood, and while they are valid indicators of self-identified ideology, they are highly unreliable. Although a measure of self-identified ideology can be useful for answering some research questions, we contend that an indicator of policy mood is more appropriate when studying the impact of public opinion on public policy, and we reiterate our confidence in using the Berry et al. (1998) measure for that purpose.

An enormous amount of research on state politics and policy relies on monetary variables. Such variables are affected by differences in the purchasing power of a dollar over time and across states, but a lack of information about geographic variation in the costs of goods and services has kept social scientists from taking these differences into account. We remove this obstacle by constructing an annual cost of living index for each continental American state from 1960 to 1995. The index constitutes a deflator suitable for cross-sectional, time-series, and pooled research. After establishing the reliability and validity of our index using a battery of diagnostic tests, we illustrate the importance of deflating monetary variables by examining two variables that are often used in state politics research.

On the assumption that poor people migrate to obtain better welfare benefits, the magnet hypothesis predicts that a state's poverty rate increases when its welfare benefit rises faster than benefits in surrounding states. The benefit competition hypothesis proposes that states lower welfare benefits to avoid attracting the poor from neighboring states. Previous investigations, which yield support for these propositions, suffer from weaknesses in model specification and methodology. We correct these deficiencies in a simultaneous equation model including a state's poverty rate and its benefit level for AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) as endogenous variables. We estimate the model using pooled annual data for the American states from 1960 to 1990 and find that a state's poverty rate does not jump significantly when its welfare payments outpace benefits in neighboring states. Furthermore, there is no evidence of vigorous benefit competition among states: states respond to decreases in neighboring states' welfare benefits with only small adjustments in their own.Perhaps the most controversial debate in the recent literature on welfare policy concerns the validity of the "race to the bottom" thesis. This thesis entails propositions about the behavior of both the poor and state policy makers. Patterned after economic theories about location decisions (e.g., Tiebout 1956), the thesis suggests that welfare benefit levels play a significant role in the residential choices of the poor. Specifically, the migration hypothesis predicts that poor persons will migrate from states with low welfare benefits to those with more generous assis-