Aims & ScopeThe peer-reviewed Journal of Phenomenological Psychology publishes articles that advance the discipline of psychology from the perspective of the Continental phenomenology movement. Within that tradition, phenomenology is understood in the broadest possible sense including transcendental, existential, hermeneutic, and narrative strands and is not meant to convey the thought of any one individual. Articles advance the discipline of psychology by applying phenomenology to enhance the field's philosophical foundations, critical reflection, theoretical development, research methodologies, empirical research, and applications in such areas as clinical, educational, and organizational psychology. Over its four decades, the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology has consistently demonstrated the relevance of phenomenology for psychology in areas involving qualitative research methods, the entire range of psychological subject matters, and theoretical approaches such as the psychoanalytic, cognitive, biological, behavioral, humanistic, and psychometric. The overall aim is to further the psychological understanding of the human person in relation to self, world, others, and time. Because the potential of Continental phenomenology for enhancing psychology is vast and the field is still developing, innovative and creative applications or phenomenological approaches to psychological problems are especially welcome. Instructions for AuthorsPlease refer to the fourth page of the volume prelims or visit Journal of Phenomenological Psychology's web site at brill.nl/jpp. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology (print ISSN 0047-2662, online ISSN 1569-1624) is published 2 times a year by Brill, Plantijnstraat 2, 2321 JC Leiden, The Netherlands, tel +31 (0)71 5353500; fax +31 (0)71 5317532. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology LEIDEN • BOSTON VOLUME 40 9 Instructions for AuthorsAuthors should submit three hard (paper) copies of the article for blind review to the Journal's editor, Dr. Frederick Wertz.All submissions must be double spaced and fully justifi ed. Each submission should include a 100-200 word abstract in block paragraph form and 2-6 keywords. Th e beginning of each new paragraph should be announced by an indentation of one tab. Quotations longer than 40 words should be placed in an indented block paragraph. New sections should be announced with bolded fl ush-left headings, and subsection headings should be italicized and fl ush-left, References and footnotes should follow APA guidelines.Electronic submissions are welcome in Microsoft Word formatting (saved as Word or rich-text documents).

Addiction can be partially seen as a worlding; as a lived-out set of ecological relations. Based on existential-phenomenology, the lived-world of the addict is described as a particular way of being in the world. Although attained through active addiction, this way of being endures beyond active addiction into recovery. Active addiction is characterized by narrowness and withdrawal from the world; recovery from addiction entails an embrace of the world. This movement into recovery is described as broadening and reaching out, a way in which the world is opened up to be experienced in all its breadth and spiritual significance. The clinical implications of this perspective are described and explored.It is common to try to understand addiction in terms of chemistry, biology, character predisposition, emotional coping, or personality issues. By contrast, this article focuses on the life-world of the addict by describing commonalities adopted by those who suffer from addiction. I contend that addiction has the effect of worlding the world of the subject. This worlding is a unique matrix of lived-relations to things, to others, and to time. This way of being in the world does not dissolve or change when active addiction stops, but, in fact, persists. Thus, one of the key factors in recovery is the adoption of another way of being in the world.A few preliminary remarks are necessary before proceeding. For the most part, this article deals with those who suffer more severe forms of addiction, and the data are drawn from my work over the past decade in London. This work includes individual and group psychotherapy with in-patients and out-patients. In this time, I have worked extensively with heroin, cocaine, crack, alcohol, and cannabis addicts. I have also worked extensively with gamblers (setting up with colleagues the first UK National Health Service [NHS] gambling service) and, to a lesser extent, with sex addicts. I suspect that these ideas are applicable across a variety of addictions, and can apply to milder forms of addiction that world in similar ways. However, some caution may be in order in how widely the notions presented here can be applied.The terms addiction and addict also need clarification. These designations are specifically chosen terms and are not meant as a vocabulary of denigration. Although other terms, such as the subject-of-addiction or the addicted-subject, may be more accurate, these terms are unwieldy and clumsy.

The author argues that relations between addicts and others are dominated by untruth. Lying is explored with regards to its origin in the primordial desire for love, while it is argued that the addict regards every question posed to them as a question about their lovability. The place of deception in Twelve-Step Fellowship movement is noted and it is also argued that the latter's notion of 'rock bottom' can be understood existentially as that place where truth cannot be denied. It is further argued that addiction itself is a form of untruth, which distorts or destroys the ambiguous lived tension of existence. This form of relating leads to the destruction of self-esteem, the development of shame and distrust and the breakdown of relationships. Truth is replaced by false narratives that are individualistic and alienating. Instead of 'dwelling in truth', the addict instrumentally alters their moods to suit their own needs. The addict escapes from this position by hitting 'rock bottom', accepting the process of truth and by opening up to the other. These notions are relayed through an exploration of phenomenological theorists and a grounded example.Relaciona´ndose con el 'otro': verdad y falsedad en la adiccio´n a drogas El autor alega que las relaciones entre consumidores de drogas y no consumidores de drogas, esta´n regidas por la falsedad. Se explora el mentir en relacio´n con sus orı´genes en el deseo primordial de ser amado mientras se discute que el consumidor de drogas considera que cada pregunta que se le hace tiene que ver con su capacidad de ser amado. Se hace referencia al movimiento llamado 'la Hermandad de los Siete Pasos' (Twelve Steps Fellowship) con su nocio´n de 'llegar a tocar el abismo' (rock bottom), pensando que e´sto se puede entender existencialmente como el llegar al lugar donde la verdad no puede ya ocultarse. Se discute ası´mismo, que la adiccio´n es una forma de falsedad que distorsiona yo destruye la tensio´n ambigua pero vital de la existencia, trayendo como consecuencia la destruccio´n de la autoestima, la tendencia a avergonzarse, la falta de confianza en los otros y la ruptura de las relaciones humanas. La verdad es reemplazada por una narrativa falsa, individualista y alienante. En lugar de concentrarse en lo verdadero, el consumidor de drogas cambia sus estados de a´nimo segu´n sus propias necesidades, pero debe llegar 'al fondo del abismo' para poder *Downloaded by [Selcuk Universitesi] at 14:55 03 January 2015 aceptar el proceso de la verdad abrie´ndose al otro. Estas nociones se expresan a trave´s de una explicacio´n fenomenolo´gica y de un ejemplo. Palabras claves: adiccio´n; mentir; verdad; falsedad; avergonzarse; relaciones humanas Bezogen sein auf den Anderen: Wahrheit und Unwahrheit bei Sucht und Abha¨ngigkeit Der Autor argumentiert, dass die Beziehungen zwischen Su¨chtigen und anderen Menschen von Unwahrheit gepra¨gt ist. Dieses Lu¨gen wird vor dem Hintergrund seiner Entstehung in einem urspru¨nglichen Verlangen nach Liebe exploriert. Es wird argumentiert, dass Su¨chtige al...

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In the A‐preface of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant kindly warns his readers to pay special attention to the chapter on the “Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding.” Looking to mitigate the reader's effort, Kant goes on to explain the chapter's methodology, suggesting that the inquiry will have “two sides.” One side deals with the “objective validity” of the pure categories of the understanding; he calls this the “objective deduction.” The other deals with the powers of cognition on which the understanding rests; he calls this the “subjective deduction.” Having gone to such great lengths to outline his method ahead of time, it comes as no small surprise that the actual chapter offers no clear indication of where the two deductions are located. In this essay, I attempt to solve this puzzle. On the way, I engage with both traditional and recent interpretations of the subjective deduction, arguing that they fail—in one way or another—to satisfy the criteria that Kant develops in the preface.