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Abtract Hume states that if a group of powerless, rational creatures lived amongst human beings, then humans would be required to treat this species with humanity but not with justice. Michael Ridge has argued that this implies humans would be required to engage in a morally dubious form of paternalism toward this imagined species. I argue that a proper understanding of why this imagined species is excluded from the scope of justice shows Hume has a plausible moral reason for requiring paternalism in this instance. The reason the imagined species is excluded is that they are incapable of feeling what I term “the pain of dependence,” or unease arising from complete dependence upon those who are more powerful. Those capable of the pain of dependence will have reason to resent exclusion from the scope of justice (and the accompanying susceptibility to paternalism). However, I contend that Hume did not think that the imagined species was capable of feeling the pain of dependence. This means that the imagined species would not consider themselves wronged when subject to paternalistic treatment, and, consequently, there is good reason to think the sort of paternalism that Hume's theory allows is not morally objectionable.

Louis Loeb has argued that Hume is pessimistic while Peirce is optimistic about the attainment of fully stable beliefs. In contrast, we argue that Hume was optimistic about such attainment but only if the scope of philosophical investigation is limited to first-order explanatory questions. Further, we argue that Peirce, after reformulating the pragmatic maxim to accommodate the reality of counterfactuals, was pessimistic about such attainment. Finally, we articulate and respond to Peirce's objection that Hume's skeptical arguments in T 1.4.1 and his commitment to common sense indicate that Hume was confused about whether we could have stable beliefs at all.