No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

This paper provides empirical evidence that challenges the factor proportions explanation of multinational activity. The same tests on intra-industry ratios and total volumes that were used to demonstrate that a substantial part of trade is explained by factor proportions and income similarities rather than differences are applied to affiliate sales with surprisingly similar results. Some support for the factor proportions hypothesis is derived by comparing affiliate production destined for export to the parent's market, which is the category of activity most likely to be motivated by factor proportions considerations, with that destined for sale in the local market. Affiliate production destined for export home is moderately more responsive to factor proportions differences. However, the two types of activity differ more in their responses to transport costs and destination market income.Overall, the evidence suggests that only a small part of multinational activity into and out of the US in the late 1980s can be explained by factor proportions differences.JELNos. F12, F21, F23

One of the most robust empirical regularities in the political economy of trade is the persistence of protection. This paper explains persistent protection in terms of the interaction between industry adjustment, lobbying, and the political response. Faced with a trade shock, owners of industry-specific factors can undertake costly adjustment, or they can lobby politicians for protection and thereby mitigate the need for adjustment. The choice depends on the returns from adjusting relative to lobbying. By introducing an explicit lobbying process, it can be shown that the level of tariffs is an increasing function of past tariffs. Since current adjustment diminishes future lobbying intensity, and protection reduces adjustment, current protection raises future protection. This simple lobbying feedback effect has an important dynamic resource allocation effect: declining industries contract more slowly over time and never fully adjust In addition, the model makes clear that the type of collapse predicted by Cassing and Hillrnan (1986) is only possible under special conditions, such as a fixed cost to lobbying. The paper also considers the symmetric case of lobbying in growing industries.