The paper evaluates Putin’s state building efforts in terms of its impact on democratic change in Russia. Putin’s evolution is treated as a response and not a solution to the legacy of the Yeltsin era reforms that created a politico-economic system lacking widespread legitimacy. It is argued that Putin’s consolidation of power through his centralization measures seriously undermines Russia’s prospects for democratization. The paper analyzes his efforts to wrest authority away from regional leaders, oligarchs, parliament and civil society. The analysis contends that concentration of state power in the absence of horizontal accountability and an effective state bureaucracy will only consolidate a non-democratic regime incapable of implementing its proclaimed public policy goals.

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This article looks at the role of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) in Russia's troubled democratization process. The author contends that post-Soviet Russian politics is plagued by a fundamental lack of consensus over regime choice issues. In this polarized setting of zero-sum politics, the KPRF has consolidated its position among anti-regime forces and can negatively impact Russia's transition to markets and democracy.

The paper seeks to evaluate the scope and limits of the Russian state’s capacity to use oil and natural gas as strategic resources to revive Russia’s fortunes as a credible global power. It offers an analysis of the evolution of state-markets interactions in the energy sector from the late Gorbachev era to the present day. The paper briefly documents how Russian foreign policy became more assertive using energy as a strategic resource, particularly in crafting its relations with the European Union. Subsequently, the paper analyzes Russia’s limits of using energy as leverage in securing foreign policy objectives. Finally, it points to the impediments to normalizing a Russo-EU energy dialog.

This paper uses an analytical framework developed from James C. Scott’s concept of state-sponsored “high modernism” to understand the scope and limits of Putin’s attempt to reconfigure state-society relations under the guise of “managed democracy.” It argues that Kremlin, under Putin’s first two presidential terms (2000–2008), attempted to treat society as a reified object separate from the state and as an object of management. The paper analyzes the Russian state’s weak regulatory capacity that coexists with its relatively strong coercive and extractive capacities. It is argued that, in spite of accessing vast resources from the energy sector, the state under Putin’s presidency was unable to successfully carry out civil service reform or implement critical reforms in the pension and housing sectors. The analytical framework used offers insights into the limits of authoritarian state-crafting and modernization in contemporary Russia.