Why do “tainted” politicians in high‐corruption countries adopt transparency and anti‐corruption policies that risk exposing their wrongdoing? Using the cases of freedom of information and public asset disclosure in Romania, we assess three explanations: that these policies are meant to be mere window dressing, facilitate bottom‐up monitoring, or ensure access to information for the ruling party if it loses power. We find that decision makers adopt transparency and anti‐corruption policies because they want to signal their integrity and because they underestimate their consequences. Because they assume they will be able to control implementation, decision makers discount the potential costs of damaging information being released. Sustained political competition can keep corruption and lack of transparency on the public and political agenda, shifting attention from policy adoption to implementation and leading to increased compliance. Since politicians miscalculate the consequences of their actions, signals that are intended to be cheap can end up being quite costly.

An increasing number of countries are adopting open government reforms, driven, in part, by the Open Government Partnership (OGP), a global effort dedicated to advancing such initiatives. Yet, there is still wide variation in openness across countries. We investigate the political, administrative, and civic factors that explain this variation, using countries’ fulfillment of OGP eligibility criteria as a proxy for minimum standards of openness. We find that countries with strong constraints on the executive and high levels of citizen education have governments that are more open. A dense network of civil society organizations is associated with more budget transparency and higher civil liberties, but not with access to information or asset disclosure laws. The results suggest that if the value of openness is to be translated in practice, it is not enough to have capable bureaucracies—countries also need informed citizens and strong oversight of executive agencies.

SUMMARYPublic sector reforms in developing countries based on global "best practices" have come under increasing criticism in the development community. The charge is that in trying to increase international legitimacy, governments copy institutional forms that are not suited to the local context. Yet, such mimicry is not the only driver of international policy diffusion. Domestic policy entrepreneurs learn from experiences of other countries and invoke global norms and values in advancing their preferred policy options. Pressures for mimicry can help such policy entrepreneurs counter resistance from domestic elites, especially in the case of value-based policies, such as transparency and anti-corruption policies. The cases of the Freedom of Information Act and the Asset Disclosure Laws in Romania are used to illustrate how external pressure for legitimacy can empower domestic policy entrepreneurs and facilitate a process akin to "problem-driven iterative adaptation" advocated by critics of isomorphic mimicry in public sector reform.

The article examines changes in the meaning and practice of government openness around the world and identifies three trends. First, the technological meaning of openness is increasingly supplanting rights-based interpretations. Second, although more countries are joining global openness initiatives, on average, governments are not becoming more transparent about their budgets or their data. Third, although more governments are using online tools to inform and consult citizens, space for civil society is shrinking. The article concludes that technological tools for openness are not by themselves sufficient for ensuring systemic government openness to genuine societal inputs.

What role can government transparency play in a democratic polity in a post-fact and a post-truth world? If the problem is not that citizens lack information about what the government does, but that they filter existing information through pre-existing ideological biases and world views, can government transparency still contribute to better informed citizens and more accountable government? To answer these questions, the article first reviews the critiques of transparency that are particularly salient in a post-fact world: that it reduces trust in government and increases polarization in deliberation. It then discusses three possible solutions: less transparency, tailored transparency, and reasoned transparency. Drawing on deliberative democracy theory, the article concludes that to reclaim the value of transparency, public administration scholars and practitioners need to move from a narrow interpretation of transparency as access to information to a broader, more holistic one, that considers more explicitly the communicative aspects of transparency and its normative foundations.